Three Essays on Urban Policies by Sun, Meiping
Three Essays on Urban Policies
Meiping (Aggie) Sun
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Columbia University
2017
© 2017 - Meiping (Aggie) Sun
All rights reserved.
Three Essays on Urban Policies
Abstract
This dissertation contains three chapters that examine urban policies. The first
chapter considers the impacts of a new card fee for prepaid transit cards in New
York City. Since 1998, the New York City Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (MTA) system has used prepaid cards (MetroCards) to collect subway
and bus fares. In 2013, the MTA imposed a $1 card fee (surcharge) on new
MetroCard purchases. Using a novel dataset with transaction-level deposit and
card use information, I show that the fee caused riders to put more money on
new MetroCard purchases, particularly those in low-income neighborhoods and
those who used cash or debit (rather than credit) cards. As a result, the net
monthly outstanding balance from transit card deposits increased dramatically,
with riders lending an extra $150 million, on an annual basis, to the MTA.
Moreover, over $20 million of the increased balances in the first year were never
redeemed and escheated to the MTA when these cards expired. The leading
explanation highlights the importance of the cost of effort to remember to carry
the same card. I pose a structural model to calibrate the effect of a new card fee.
Counterfactual simulation predicts that a new card fee of $4.35 will maximize the
MTA’s profit. These findings have implications for fiscal policy designs and fee
structures of prepaid card industry.
The second chapter examines the causal effects of local access to alcohol on
birth outcomes. After the repeal of National Prohibition in 1933, 30 states gave
counties and municipalities the local option to continue alcohol restrictions.
Citizens set alcohol control policies in their communities through
jurisdiction-wide elections (i.e., local option elections). Currently, 10% of U.S.
communities maintain a ban on some or all alcohol sales. Assessing the impact of
local access to alcohol on alcohol-related outcomes such as birth weight, drinking
under the influence, alcohol-related crimes, and so on is complicated by the
potential non-random selection of liquor laws. I examine the causal effects of
local access to alcohol on birth outcomes by comparing municipalities where
referenda on legalizing liquor sales passed and failed by narrow margins. My
results indicate that municipalities which were studied experienced higher
incidence of low birth weight after legalizing the local sale of alcohol to the
general public. The incidence of low birth weight rose by 4.5% for babies born
within two years after the elections.
The third chapter measures the deleterious effect of institutional
discrimination on health. Interest in the impact of institutional discrimination on
health outcomes has increased dramatically. Since research has mostly been done
in the western context where social segregation has already been established, it is
difficult to isolate the effect of initial social segregation on health outcomes. In
this chapter, I examine the causal effect of institutional discrimination on health
by exploiting a 1964 change in household registration system (hukou) in China,
which caused a nationwide discrimination against rural dwellers. The 1964
change in the hukou system started to put tight control on domestic migration.
Thereafter, movement from rural to urban areas became virtually impossible.
Following the 1964 change in hukou policy, the fraction of urban hukou residents
suddenly fell from over 50% to about 40%. I use this discontinuity in the
proportion of urban hukou residents to identify the causal effect of institutional
discrimination anchored in the hukou system on health. The
regression-discontinuity (RD) design estimates suggest that urban hukou
citizens have much better chances of being in good health. The deleterious effect
of rural hukou on health possibly works through mechanisms of labor disparity,
limited access to healthcare, and deprivation of quality education.
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Money forMetroCards: How aNewCard
FeeMade Transit Riders InvestMore and
LoseMore
1.1 Introduction
Prepaid cards have become an increasingly prominent form of payment for many
industries and public services providers. For instance, currently over 23 million
US adults, mostly ”unbanked” consumers from low-income households, use gen-
eral purpose reloadable cards such as Green-Dot Card every month (Urahn et al.
38). Some controversy has emerged because merchants are critical of the card
fees, challenging both structure and level, and heated debates among researchers,
practitioners, and policymakers have ensued. While the academic literature has
1
so far focused on fees that are proportional to the transaction values or fixed per-
transaction fees, the effect of a new card fee is not clear, especially in monopolistic
markets.
In this paper, I show how a new card fee for prepaid transit cards induced riders
to put more money on cards and lose more when these cards expired. I present
a novel transaction-level data set from the public transit system in New York City
that allows me to analyze changes in deposit amounts and the forgone balance on
expired cards. The data set contains detailed information on all the deposits and
card uses from January 2013 to May 2015, with more than 100 million observa-
tions.
InMarch2013, theNewYorkCityMetropolitanTransportationAuthority (MTA)
imposed a $1 ”green” card fee on new MetroCard purchases to motivate riders to
refill and keep using their existing cards rather than purchasing new ones, thereby
reducing litter. The Authority’s stated goal behind the card fee was achieved as the
number of new MetroCards sold dropped immediately and stayed low after the
card fee was imposed. Before 2013, the Authority, on average, sold about 7 mil-
lion cards per month. After the card fee, this number dropped to about 2 million
per month. Meanwhile, there was only a minor decrease in ridership since the im-
position of the card fee.
Surprisingly, riders started to make much larger deposits on new MetroCard
purchases after the $1 new card fee (surcharge); this translates into riders lend-
ing the transit authority $150 million more annually. The monthly outstanding
balance that riders carry on their MetroCards (defined as the difference between
the total amount loaded on the cards in that month and the reductions caused
by swipes at turnstiles in the same month1) jumped from less than $35 million
to more than $45 million. Currently, the MTA is paying 0.37% interest on funds
raised from short-term notes. This additional free lending potentially saved the
MTA hundreds of thousands of dollars in interest payments.
Moreover, over $20million of the increased balances in the first year were never
1Mathematically, the net outstanding balance for a specific month is calculated as Balance =∑




redeemed and escheated to the MTA when these cards expired. Each MetroCard
is valid for 18months after the initial purchase; inactive balances on cards become
assets of MTA under the category ”expired fare revenue” after the expiration date.
The aggregate forgone balance (i.e., expired fare revenue) in 2015, from cards ini-
tially purchased in late 2013 and 2014, the first year after the MTA implemented
the card fee, increased to $75 million from $52 million, the aggregate forgone bal-
ance in 2014.
There arefivemainempirical findings regarding changes indeposit amounts and
forgone balances on expired cards. First, the changes largely came from new cards
that would not have subsequent refill activities, not from cards that showed sub-
sequent refill activities. Second, the changes mainly came from cash or debit card
payments rather than fromcredit cardpayments. Third, among cashpayments, the
changes were mostly from payments made at vending machines rather than from
payments made at manned booths (tellers). Fourth, the response to the new card
fee was larger in low-income neighborhoods than in high-income neighborhoods.
Fifth, the response to the new card fee was not primarily from tourists. Although
part of the changes couldhave come from tourists and short-termvisitors, deposits
and forgone balances increased dramatically in neighborhoods with few tourists
such as South Bronx and Sunset Park in Brooklyn.
The increase in deposit amounts and leftover balances on expired cards was
unanticipated: theMTAnever said that the goal of this card feewas to attractmore
deposits; also, the card fee on a new MetroCard purchase is a one-time fee, which
should have no impact on deposit amounts. Now the question is: why did riders
make larger deposits to theirMetroCards and losemoremoney after the new card
feewas introduced? I explore potential explanations, including avoidance of coins,
persuasion by vending machine messages, and commitment device.
In my view, these findings are consistent with a rational model that highlights
the importance of the cost of effort to remember to bring the sameMetroCard for
future rides, thefixedcost ofmakingdeposits toMetroCards, andconsumeruncer-
tainty about future rides. WhenMetroCards were free, riders with a low fixed cost
of making deposits to MetroCards chose not to incur the cost of effort to remem-
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ber to bring the same card for future days. They deposited only a small amount of
money on cards and purchased a newMetroCard each period if needed. After the
new card fee was imposed, many riders switched to refilling existing cards since
their cost of effort to remember to carry the same card was smaller than the new
card fee. They started making larger deposits to save on the fixed cost of making
deposits to cards. Because consumers are uncertain about future rides, these riders
on average had higher leftover balances after the card expiration dates.
To calibrate the effect of a new card fee, I develop and estimate a dynamicmodel
ofMetroCard deposits and usage that makes use of detailedMetroCard data from
the years 2013 to 2015. Givenmy parameter estimates, counterfactual simulations
predict the effect of a $1 new card fee had it been implemented with all the de-
fault choices of deposit amounts giving an exact number of rides. Holding prices
fixed, my simulations predict an increase in expired fare revenue of $19.76 million
(39.52%) after the $1 card fee was imposed on new MetroCard purchases, as op-
posed to $25 million. I then simulate the amount of new card fee that maximizes
the MTA’s profit while holding the payment prompts on Touchscreen and base
fare for every subway ride fixed. The model predicts that a new card fee of $4.35
will .
The importance of the cost of effort to remember to carry the same card and the
fixed cost to make deposits to cards may explain the prevalence of required min-
imum deposit amounts in the online or mobile prepaid services such as E-ZPass
and Skype. When authorities or firms adopt online or mobile payments with an
automatic deduction from bank accounts or credit cards, consumers’ fixed cost to
make payments converges to zero. As a result, cash flow from prepaid services will
drop significantly as consumers switch from prepaying for future consumption to
pay only for consumption this period (pay-as-you-go). To maintain the benefit
from unused account balances, most online or mobile prepaid services providers
have required minimum deposit amounts and use suggested deposit amounts to
attract even more deposits.
The results of this study are likely to generalize to 8.3 million Americans who
use public transit to go to work. 10.65 billion passenger trips were taken on transit
4
systems in 2013 (American Public Transportation Association 2014). Therefore,
both in termsofmonetarymagnitude and in termsof population involved, the new
card fee on transit card has a significant economic impact. Empirical analysis on
optimal pricing for public transit systemhas been limited, withmost studies focus-
ing on the demand elasticity of rides in response to fare increases ([39]; Vickrey
40; De Palma and Lindsey 12; Small and Verhoef 36; Tirachinia andHenshera 37;
De Jong and Gunn 11; Litman 26; Chen et al. 8; Miao and Gao 27). This paper is
the first to examine in detail the effects of a new transit card fee. I show that a new
card fee induced riders, especially low-income riders, to putmoremoney on cards
and lose more when these cards expired.
These findings also have implications for the fee structure of payment cards, es-
pecially reloadable prepaid debit cards. The academic literature has so far focused
on fees that are proportional to the transaction values or fixed per-transaction fees
(Shy andWang 35; Schwartz andVincent 33; Schmalensee 32). [35] showed that,
when card networks and merchants both have market power, card networks earn
higher profits by charging proportional fees. [33] showed that, when a card com-
pany faces local monopolist merchants, the No Surcharge Rule which prohibits
merchants from charging higher prices to consumers who pay by card instead of
other means (’cash’) raises card company profit and harms cash users and mer-
chants. Complementing prior studies, I show that, when a prepaid card issuer has
market power, a new card fee (or card activation fee) could push consumers to
prepay more for future consumption.
Finally, these findings have implication about regressive ways to raise money.
Mainly due to data limitations, studies on regressive fees focus on the portion of
fee revenue collected from low-income people (Dorfman 13; Gertler et al. 15;
Grainger and Kolstad 16 and Leape 24). Here I provide evidence that whether or
not the card fee itself is regressive, it may push low-income consumers to behave
in ways that cost them money, especially in monopolistic market. The authorities
should take into consideration the possible additional responses from low-income
people when imposing a fee.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief in-
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troduction toMetroCards and the new card fee. Section 3 describesmain features
ofMetroCard data sets used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the main
findings aboutMetroCard sales, deposit patterns, and leftover balances on expired
cards. Section 5 describes my model and identification in a simplified setting Sec-
tion 6 discusses estimation and counterfactual analysis. Section 7 considers other
potential mechanisms that might explain the results. Section 8 performs robust-
ness tests. Section 9 concludes the paper.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 MetroCard
The MetroCard is a stored ride fare card for the New York City public transit sys-
tem. It is a thin plastic card on which a rider electronically loads fares. Various
types ofMetroCards are available for purchase. There are two types of value-based
cards: pay-per-ride MetroCards and single-ride tickets. Also, there are two types
of time-based cards: 7-day-unlimited MetroCards and 30-day-unlimited Metro-
Cards. The minimum purchase on a new pay-per-ride MetroCard is the fare of a
round trip (currently $5.50). No minimum purchase is required for refill transac-
tions. Riders can put as much money on the card as they want.
A rider canpurchasenewor refill existingMetroCards at a subway stationMetro-
Card vending machine (MVM) (Figure 1.9.1a) or at a station’s manned booth
(teller) (Figure 1.9.1b) 2. Upon the imposition of the card fee in March 2013,
there was no major change in the user interface of vending machine screens, ex-
cept for the addedmessage about the card fee (Figure 1.9.2). More information is
available on MTA’s website: www.mta.info.
2MetroCards can also be purchased out-of-system through the MTA extended sales network
(including merchants and tax-benefit providers), which now accounts for the majority of Metro-
Cards sold. Approximately 2.8 million MetroCards are sold out-of-system each month, and this
level has not changed noticeably since the introduction of the $1 new card fee (out-of-system sales
are not subject to the $1 fee).
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Bonus Free Ride for Pay-per-ride Purchases
Since January 1, 1998, the MTA has given a ”bonus” for pay-per-ride purchases
that are at or above a certain threshold amount. For instance, from June 28, 2009,
to December 29, 2010, the bonus value for pay-per-ride purchases was 15% of the
purchase amount for purchases of $8 or more. For example, when a rider made a
deposit of $10 to a pay-per-ride MetroCard, the card balance increased by $11.50
($10 + $1.50).
This is not a typical bonus since it is always a certain percent of the purchase
amount (i.e., linear) while a usual bonus is an increasing percent of the purchase
amount (i.e., non-linear). Currently, the bonus value for pay-per-rideMetroCards
is 11% of the purchase amount for purchases of $5.50 ormore (Table 1.9.1 row 6).
1.2.2 Policy Changes
Table 1 shows the recent history of MTA policy changes. Column 1 presents the
fare hike in 2009. On June 28, 2009, the base subway and bus fare rose from $2
to $2.25. The monthly MetroCard rose from $81 to $89. The weekly MetroCard
rose from $25 to $27. The pay-per-ride MetroCard bonus remained at 15%, but
the threshold for the bonus increased from $7 to $8.
Column 2 lists the fare hike at the end of 2010. OnDecember 30, 2010, the 30-
day-unlimited card increased to $104 and the 7-day-unlimited card increased to
$29. The bonus value for pay-per-ride cards decreased to 7% for every $10. There
was no change in base subway andbus fares, but the cost of a single-ride ticketwent
from $2.25 to $2.50.
Column 3 shows the fare hike in 2013. On March 3, 2013, the base subway
and bus fare increased from $2.25 to $2.50. The cost of a 30-day-unlimited card
increased to $112. The cost of a 7-day-unlimited card increased to $30. The bonus
for the pay-per-rideMetroCard decreased from7% to 5%, but the threshold for the
bonus decreased from $10 to $5. The price of a single-ride ticket increased from
$2.50 to $2.75. TheMTA also imposed a $1 fee on new card purchases, the impact
of which forms the basis of this study.
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Column 4 depicts the fare hike in 2015. On March 22, 2015, the base fare of
subway and bus rides rose from $2.50 to $2.75. The cost of a 7-day-unlimited card
rose from $30 to $31 and the cost of a 30-day-unlimited card increased from $112
to $116.50. Pay-per-ride bonuses increased from 5% to 11% for purchases greater
than or equal to $5.50.
Card Fee on New Purchases
The main policy change that concerns this paper is the imposition of a card fee on
newMetroCard purchases. A newMetroCard itself used to be cost-free. A $1 new
card fee, tackedonwhen someonebuys anewMetroCard, went into effectwith the
fare hikes onMarch 3, 2013. The fee applies to each newMetroCard purchased at a
MetroCard VendingMachine, station booth, or commuter rail station. Riders can
avoid this fee by refilling their MetroCards. TheMTAwill issue a newMetroCard
at no charge if a card is expired or damaged. The new $1 charge did not apply to
single-ride tickets or to MetroCards bought by reduced fare customers (seniors
and customers with disabilities)3.
1.2.3 Environmental Impact
The transportation authority justified the new policy of the $1 card fee on new
MetroCards purchases in environmental terms, arguing that the policy would lead
to cleaner subway stations by discouraging people from littering subway stations
with their discarded, empty MetroCards. MTA officials mentioned this fee as an
environmentally friendly initiative in numerous news reports 4. On average, it
3Also, the card fee does not apply to MetroCards purchased out-of-system through MTA ex-
tended sales merchants, users of EasyPayXpress cards, transit benefit organization customers who
get their MetroCards directly from employers or their benefit providers, or customers who pur-
chase a combination railroad/MetroCard ticket. Out-of-system MetroCard sales now account for
the majority of MetroCards sold. Approximately 2.8 million MetroCards are sold out-of-system
each month, and this level has not changed noticeably when comparing MetroCard numbers sold
before and after the card fee went into effect.
4Some news reports whereMTA talked about the $1 new card fee: NYTimes, NYDailyNews,
NBC News
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costs the agency $20million a year to print and clean up discarded cards from sub-
way stations. According toMTA, after the imposition of the new card fee, printing
fewer MetoCards and trimming cleanup costs was expected to save about $2 mil-
lion a year 5.
1.3 Data
In this section, I present the main features of the datasets used in this study. This
paper documents changes in deposit amounts on MetroCard purchases and in-
creases in forgone balances on expired MetroCards using three data sets: Metro-
Card deposit data, swipe data, and trade-in and trade-out data.
1.3.1 MetroCard Deposit Data
Monthly-Aggregate Deposit Data
The MetroCard monthly revenue data from January 2009 to June 2015 includes
information on the number of deposit transactions (new sales versus refills) aswell
as total in-system MetroCard purchase amounts, broken out for various types of
MetroCards 6.
Transaction-level Deposit Data
The transaction-level MetroCard deposit data7, covers all deposit transactions for
the following periods: 1) May 1, 2009 - September 30, 2009; 2) January 1, 2013 -
5Some news reports where MTA mentioned the potential savings from the imposition of the
new care fee: NY Daily News-1, NY Daily News-2, NBC New York
6Pay-per-ride, 7-day-unlimited, 30-day-unlimited, 7-day-unlimited Express, single-ride,
reduced-fare seniors and disabled, etc.
7This dataset included deposit transactions from the New York City Subway rapid transit sys-
tem; NewYorkCity Transit buses, including routes operated by Atlantic Express under contract to
the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA); MTA Bus, and Nassau Inter-County Express
systems; the PATH subway system; the Roosevelt Island Tram; AirTrain JFK; and Westchester
County’s Bee-Line Bus System
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May 1, 2013; and 3) September 1, 2014 - May 31, 2015. Each observation corre-
sponds to aMetroCarddeposit transactionand includes informationon the amount
of money added to the card, the station at which the card was purchased, the date
and time of purchase, the type of deposit, themethod of payment, and the balance
of the MetroCard before the transaction. The data also include information on
whether the transaction took place at a booth station or at a vending machine.
1.3.2 MetroCard Swipe Data
Transaction-level Swipe Data
The transaction-level swipe data8, covers all MetroCard swipe transactions for the
time period from January 1, 2013 toMay 31, 2015. Each observation corresponds
to aMetroCard swipe transactionand includes informationon the amountofmoney
deducted from the card, the station or bus route at which the card was swiped, the
date and time of card swipe, and the balance of theMetroCard before the transac-
tion.
Weekly-Aggregate Swipe Data
This data set includes the total number of MetroCard swipes riders made each
week as they entered each station of the New York City Subway, PATH, AirTrain
JFK and Roosevelt Island Tram from January 2011 to June 2015, broken out for
various types of MetroCards.
1.3.3 MetroCard Trade-in and Trade-out Data
Riders can transfermoney in (trade-in) andout (trade-out) across differentMetro-
Cards they have. Also, riders can trade in their old cards that expired within the
8This dataset included MetroCard swipe transactions from the New York City Subway rapid
transit system; New York City Transit buses, including routes operated by Atlantic Express un-
der contract to the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA); MTA Bus, and Nassau Inter-
County Express systems; the PATH subway system; the Roosevelt IslandTram; AirTrain JFK; and
Westchester County’s Bee-Line Bus System
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past twoyears and transfer any remainingmoney to anewcard. This data set allows
me to linkmultiple cards to the same rider. I can then compare changes in deposit
amounts and foregone balances on cards initially purchased before and after the
implementation of the new card fee by the same rider.
1.4 Main Findings
The main empirical findings are summarized in Table 1.9.2. In particular, riders
purchased MetroCards with much larger deposits after the imposition of the new
card fee. Consequently, the monthly outstanding balance of deposits and forgone
balances on expired cards jumped up significantly.
1.4.1 Purchases of New MetroCards Dropped After the New Card
Fee was Introduced
Table 1.9.3 shows the monthly purchase of new MetroCards from January 2009
to June 2015. After the implementation of the new card fee, the total monthly
new MetroCard sales dropped from over 7 million to about 2 million and stayed
low, which is very robust across different subgroups: the monthly sales of new
pay-per-ride cards decreased from 5.8 million to 1.8 million; the monthly sales of
new 30-day-unlimited cards decreased by about 75% to about 0.15 million; and
the monthly sales of new 7-day-unlimited cards decreased by over 1.2 million to
0.34 million.
Figure 1.9.3 plots the monthly newMetroCard sales from January 2009 to June
2015. Thisfigure shows thatnewMetroCard salesdropped immediately and stayed
low after the imposition of the new card fee, confirming the summary statistics in
Table 1.9.3. I replicated this analysis using transaction-level deposit data in Figure
3.0.1. This figure plots the daily newMetroCard sales from January 1, 2013 toApril
30, 2013. The MTA sold about 0.2 million new MetroCards daily before the new
card fee was introduced. This estimate dropped immediately to about 0.13million
on the first day the new card fee was implemented and further decreased gradually
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over the next two months. Similar results are observed for all three MetroCard
subgroups (Figure 1.9.5-1.9.7).
Regression-Discontinuity Approach
Since there was no significant sorting of MetroCard purchases around the date
when the MTA implemented the new card fee, I estimated the effect of the new
card fee with a regression discontinuity (RD) design. Under somemild regularity
conditions, the average causal effect of the new card fee on MetroCard sales just
before and just after the new card fee could be identified. There was no disconti-
nuity in ridership or other covariates around the implementation date of the new
card fee.
Assuming a homogeneous effect of the new card fee on MetroCard sales with
one cutoff date:
Yt = β + γ1{t ≥ t0}+ a(t) + Xt + ut, (1.1)
where t is the indexed date, Yt denotes the newMetroCard sales on day t, t0 was
the distinct cutoff point (i.e., March 3, 2013), a(.) is a flexible function of date,
X is a set of controls including day-of-week and month-of-year fixed effects. The
coefficient of interest is γ whichmeasures the effect of the new card fee on changes
in daily new MetroCard sales.
I present estimates using the analog of the [5] bandwidth selectors for sharp
RD. Similar estimates are observed under alternative bandwidth selectors based
on the [20]. In the baseline specifications, I used local quadratic regression (a local
polynomial of order two) for a(.). Across specifications, the estimated effect of the
new card fee fromboth local linear and local quadratic regressions corroborate the
visual evidence.
Table 1.9.4 presents the results for the effects of the new card fee on changes in
daily new MetroCard sales from January 1, 2013 to April 30, 2013, using different
control variables in each specification. The model in column 2 controls for day of
week. The results show that the implementation of the new card fee caused a sig-
12
nificant decrease of 125,000 (70%) in daily newMetroCard purchases. To account
for the possibility of variations inMetroCard sales across differentmonths,mypre-
ferred specification in column 3 included month-of-year fixed effects. As with the
other controls, the addition of month-of-year fixed effects has little impact on the
estimated effects of the new card fee.
Using this preferred specification, Table 1.9.5 includes measures of changes in
daily new card sales for 7-day-unlimited and 30-day-unlimited cards as well as pay-
per-ride cards in response to the implementation of the new card fee. The imposi-
tion of the new card fee led to a decrease of 120,000 (65%) in daily new pay-per-
ride MetroCard sales, a decrease of 23,000 (73%) in daily new 7-day-unlimited
MetroCard sales, and a decrease of 24,000 (75%) in daily new 30-day-unlimited
MetroCard sales.
1.4.2 Deposits to MetroCards Increased Significantly
After theMTA imposed the new card fee, riders who purchased newMetroCards,
on average, made larger deposits. The imposition of the new card fee led to a de-
crease in the percentage of riders whomade deposits of approximately $5 by about
40% and an increase in the percentage of riders who made deposits of approxi-
mately $10 and $20 by about 35% (Figure 1.9.12a and Figure 1.9.13a). I checked
the robustness of the findings by limiting my focus to deposit transactions within
one week before and after the imposition of the new card fee. The same changes in
deposit amounts are observable (Figure 1.9.12b and 1.9.13b). As a result, monthly
revenue jumps up by 9.4%, from around $160 million to $175 million after the
implementation of the new card fee (Figure 1.9.11a). This increase in monthly
revenue becomes more noticeable when looking at year-on-year monthly revenue
(Figure 1.9.11b).
I then used equation (3.1) to evaluate the effects of the new card fee on the
amounts of deposits. Table 1.9.6 presents the results for the effects of the new card
fee on changes in deposit amounts on new pay-per-ride purchases from January
1, 2013, to April 30, 2013, using different control variables in each specification.
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The model in column 3 controls for day-of-week fixed effects. The results show
that implementation of the new card fee caused a significant increase of $1.64 in
deposit amounts on new pay-per-ride purchases. Riders, on average, made larger
deposits duringmorning and evening rush hours. To account for the possibility of
variations in deposit amounts across different neighborhoods, my preferred spec-
ification in column 4 included station fixed effects. The addition of station fixed
effects causes the estimated effects of the new card fee to be smaller, which indi-
cates that there is heterogeneity in deposit amounts across different stations.
1.4.3 Changes in the Outstanding Balance of Deposits
Because of the minor decrease in ridership and the significant increases in de-
posit amounts, the monthly outstanding balance of deposits made to pay-per-ride
MetroCards unexpectedly jumped by about one-third, from around $35 million
to over $45 million after the imposition of the new card fee (Figure 1.9.8). The
aggregate monthly outstanding balance that riders carried on their MetroCard is
defined as the difference between the total amount loaded on the cards and the
reductions caused by swipes at turnstiles9. This additional outstanding balance
translates to riders lending, on an annual basis, an extra $150 million to the MTA.
In contrast, the net outstanding balance showed no significant increase after the
9Mathematically, the net outstanding balance for month i is calculated as:
Balancemi =
∑
deposits ∗ (1+ bonus(%))−
∑
rides ∗ basefare (1.2)
where base fare is $2.0 for months before February 2008, $2.25 for months fromMarch 2008 to
February 2013; $2.5 for months from March 2013 to February 2015.







rides ∗ basefare (1.3)
However, I only have aggregate monthly deposit amounts data and cannot observe bonus
amount for each deposit transaction. Hence, the outstanding balance calculated using equation
(1) is the upper bound of the outstanding balance for each month. Since the threshold for bonus
free rideswasmuchhigher ($10) before the new card feewas imposed, the jump in the outstanding
balance from the imposition of the new card fee should be even larger.
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fare hikes in 2009 or 2010, nor after the fare hike in 2015. Hence, the observed
changes in deposit patterns after the new card fee was not likely driven primarily
by the $0.25 increase of base fare.
1.4.4 Increases in Forgone Balances on Expired MetroCards
Moreover, over $20 million of the increased balances on MetroCards that were
purchased in the first year after the new card feewas imposedwere never redeemed
and escheated to the MTA when these cards expired. Each MetroCard is valid
for 18 months after the initial purchase; inactive balances on cards become assets
of MTA under the category ”expired fare revenue” after the expiration date. The
aggregate forgone balance (i.e., expired fare revenue) in 2015, from cards initially
purchased in late 2013 and 2014, the first year after the MTA implemented the
card fee, increased to $75 million from $52 million, the aggregate forgone balance
in 2014.
Figure 1.9.9 plots the aggregate leftover balances on MetroCards initially pur-
chased between January 1, 2013 andApril 30, 2013. This figure shows that the left-
overbalancesonexpiredMetroCards jumpedbyabout50%, fromaround$150,000
to over $250,000 after the imposition of the new card fee, confirming the observed
increase in aggregate leftover balances on expired MetroCards.
1.4.5 DepositstoMetroCardsShowDifferentChanges: NewMetro-
Cards That Would be Held for Different Lengths of Time
In order to explore the change in deposit patterns further, I examined the deposit
pattern in MetroCards held for different lengths of time. Deposits on new pay-
per-ride purchases increased tremendously for MetroCards without subsequent
refill activities 10 (Figure 1.9.14a). Before the new card fee, about 60% of deposits
were $5 or less for pay-per-rideMetroCards that hadno subsequent refill activities.
After the newcard fee, this percentage droppedbyhalf to about 30%,while the per-
10Tominimizemeasurement errors, I only focused on cards purchased before April 1, 2013 and
give each card at least one month to demonstrate refill activities.
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centage of $10 or $20 deposits almost doubled. In contrast, therewas only aminor
change in the initial deposit amount forMetroCards that showed subsequent refill
activities (Figure 1.9.14b).
1.4.6 Heterogeneity in Deposits to New Pay-per-ride Cards and For-
gone Balances on Expired Cards: By Payment Methods
With transaction-levelMetroCard information, I examined the changes in deposit
amounts and forgone balances on cards purchased using different payment meth-
ods (cash, debit card, versus credit card). The main changes came from cash or
debit card payments rather than from credit card payments. Consistent with the
pattern of deposit changes, there was higher forgone fare on MetroCards initially
purchasedbycashordebit cards rather thanbycredit cards (Figure1.9.16b, 1.9.16d,
and 1.9.16f). For credit card payments, there was only a slight increase in deposit
amounts and forgone balances after riders are charged a fee for purchasing a new
MetroCard (Figure 1.9.16e and 1.9.17c). In contrast, the percentage of riders who
made cash deposits of approximately $10 or $20 increased significantly, from 33%
to 63%. The percentage of riders who made cash deposits of approximately $5
dropped by about one-third (Figure 1.9.16a and 1.9.17a). For debit card pay-
ments, the percentage of riders who made deposits of approximately $10 or $20
increased significantly from 46% to 63%. The percentage of riders who made de-
posits of approximately $5 dropped by about half (Figure 1.9.16c and 1.9.17b).
Changes in Deposit Amounts Across Different Neighborhoods
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) indicates that it is primarily the poor
who use cash in the US ([2]; [21]). To test whether this is true in the case of
MetroCards, I linked the deposit amounts in different subway stations to local
census tract income data. As shown in Figure 1.9.18, low-income neighborhoods
have amuch higher percentage of cash payments compared to high-income neigh-
borhoods. This finding is in line with other studies on cash usage across different
socioeconomic groups ([22]; [14]).
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Since the increase in the outstanding balance mainly came from cash or debit-
card payments, the new card fee may cause a stronger tendency to loadmore onto
their cards among low-income communities. Controlling for station-level covari-
ates, I used a regression framework to evaluate the effects of newcard feeondeposit
amounts across different neighborhoods. The empiricalmodel takes the following
forms:
Y = θ0 + θ1Surcharge + θ2Income + θ3Surcharge*Income + λX + ε
where Y is the deposit amount for pay-per-ride MetroCards, and Surcharge is
an indicator for observations after the implementation of the new card fee. Income
represents log-income at the census-tract level. X is a set of controls such as day-of-
weekfixed effects. Thecoefficient of interest is θ3, the coefficient on the interaction
of Surcharge and Income, which measures the effect of income level on changes
in deposit amounts after the new card fee relative to changes in deposit amounts
before the new card fee.
Table 1.9.7 presents the results for the effect of the new card fee on deposit
amounts using MetroCard transactions from January 1, 2013 to April 30, 2013.
After the implementation of the new card fee, the change in deposit amounts was
larger inpoorerneighborhoods. On theotherhand, there areno significant changes
in ridership across different neighborhoods before and after the new card fee (Ta-
ble 1.9.8). These results indicate that the new card fee induces poor riders tomake
larger deposits on new MetroCard purchases and lose more balances on expired
cards, which is not surprising because riders from richer neighborhoods already
made large deposits on their MetroCards before the new card fee was imposed.
1.5 Model
I present a simplemodel that highlights card carrying cost and estimate thismodel
using my observational data. A rider is assumed to take two rides (a round-trip)
or no rides each day. The base fare for a ride is p. Each rider is assumed to live
in New York City for the next n-day time period (n ∈ (0, inf)). The card fee for
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purchasing a new MetroCard is T. The discount factor is ignored since the time
horizon is small.
For rider i, the fixed cost of each deposit (e.g., the opportunity cost of waiting in
line to add money to the card, the expected opportunity cost of missing a train in
station, etc) is ci. Among riders, latent ci is normally distributed censored at zero:
Nc ∼ (μc, σc). Rider i incurs a utility cost ei to remember to carry the sameMetro-
Card for the next day. Among riders, latent ei is normally distributed censored at
zero among riders: Ne ∼ (μe, σe). (Throughout the paper, I will use the param-
eters of the pre-censoring distributions to describe the censored distributions.)
The correlation, ρc,e, between ei and ci is assumed to be zero since ci depends on
rider i’s opportunity cost of time while ei depends on rider i’s mental cost to be
well-organized.
We start observing riders on day 1when they are about to take a round-trip. On
each day but the first, qi is the probability of taking a round-trip for rider i. Among
riders, latent qi is normally distributed censored at zero and one: Nq ∼ (μq, σq).
Given that realization of qi, demand for trips is inelastic. For now, I assume that qi
is independent of the price of a subway ride. This is a reasonable approximation
for the changes I study. In the appendix, I show how the results can be extended
to the general case where qi depends on the price of a subway ride. Ni denotes the
number of rides that rider i actually takes. Hence,Ni is distributed binomially with
parameters 2n and qi ∼ B(2n, qi).
On day t, rider i makes choice of deposit amount Dit ∈ [0, 2np] to her Metro-
Card. The delivery of fares is immediate. Also, rider i decides whether or not to
exert effortEit ∈ {0, 1} to remember to carry the same card to the next day on day
t. Rider i incurs utility cost ei if she exerts effort (i.e., Eit = 1). Every day t, rider i
decides whether or not to incur costCit tomake a deposit on her card. LetCit = 1
if she decides to do so (i.e., if Dit > 0) and Cit = 0 otherwise (i.e., if Dit = 0)
The marginal utility of a subway or bus ride for rider i on day t is rit. Assume
riders are risk neutral and they have quasilinear utility. The marginal value of a
dollar is normalized to one. Rider i’s money-metric utility from riding subways
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Keep the same card for next day Condition to Carry the Same Card
Save on card fee Loss on Carrying cost When Card Balance is Zero
No Card Fee 0 ei ei = 0
With Card Fee qiT ei ei < qiT
and buses on day t ≥ 2 is:
Uit = qi(rit − Dit − Eitei − Citci − T(1− Ei,t−1)) (1.4)
When purchasing a new MetroCard with card fee T and take two rides in day







qi(Dit +Eitei +Citci +T(1−Ei,t−1)))]
(1.5)
1.5.1 Modeling Response of New MetroCard Purchases to the New
Card Fee
When will riders choose to carry the same MetroCard to the next day when the
card balance is zero (i.e., when will riders choose to refill the same card)? The
table below outlines the conditions under which a rider would choose to bring the
same MetroCard under different policies when the card balance is zero. If no card
fee is imposed, riders will discard their MetroCards when the card balance is zero
if ei > 0, i.e., if they have to incur a utility cost to remember to carry the same
card to the next day. If riders are charged a fee for purchasing a new MetroCard,
they will keep the same card for the next period when the card balance is zero if
the decrease in utility they suffer from having to pay the new card fee is larger than
the cost to remember to carry the same card for the next period.
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1.5.2 Optimal Strategy: Prepay versus No Prepay
To begin the analysis, I look at the case of n = 2. When n = 2, the rider’s only
decision is whether to prepay for rides in the second day. The table below outlines
the conditions under which a rider would choose to prepay for rides. When no
card fee is imposed, riders will prepay for future rides only if the fixed cost tomake
deposits is larger than the cost to remember to carry the same card for the next
day and the risk of losing the deposit. If riders are charged a fee for purchasing a
new MetroCard, riders will prepay for future rides only if the fixed cost to make
deposits and pay the new card fee is larger than the cost to remember to carry the
same card for the next day and the risk of losing the deposit.
Figure 1.9.19 shows the threshold of prepaying for rides in the second daywhen
no card fee is imposed (Figure 1.9.19a) and when a card fee is imposed (Figure
1.9.19b), respectively. Before the new card fee was imposed, riders in region C
only deposited the fare of the first day’s rides since the decrease in utility they suffer
from having to incur the fixed cost to make deposits in the second day is smaller
than the cost to remember to carry the same card to the second day and the risk
of losing the deposit. After the new card fee was imposed, these riders switched to
prepaying for rides in the second day as the fixed cost tomake deposits and pay the
new card fee is larger than the cost to remember to carry the same card for the next
period and the risk of losing the deposit. As a result, they risk losing 2p on expired
MetroCards if they do not actually take rides in the second day (Table 1.9.9).
Tourists versus Local Residents
The model developed above supports the observation that major changes in de-
posit amounts and forgone balances came from MetroCards purchased by local
residents rather than by tourists. Visitors are likely to have low probability of tak-
ing a round-trip in the second day (i.e., small qi). Also, visitors may have low fixed
cost tomake deposits to aMetroCard (i.e., small ci) since theymay not understand
they are missing a train or they are on vacation so their time is not very valuable.
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3*Cost Function 3*Decision Variables Condition to Prepay
for Rides in the
Second Day
6*With Card Fee 2*4p + ei + ci Ei,1 = Ci,1 = 1 and Ci,2 = 1 6*
ei + (1 − qi)2p
< qici
Di,1 = 4p and Di,2 = 0
2*(1 + qi)2p + ei + (1 + qi)ci Ei,1 = Ci,1 = Ci,2 = 1
Di,1 = Di,2 = 2p
2*(1 + qi)2p + (1 + qi)ci Ei,1 = 0 and Ci,1 = Ci,2 = 1
Di,1 = Di,2 = 2p
6*With Card Fee 2*4p + ei + ci + T Ei,1 = Ci,1 = 1 and Ci,2 = 1 3*
If ei < qiT
(1 − qi)2p < qici
Di,1 = 4p and Di,2 = 0
2*(1 + qi)2p + ei + (1 + qi)ci + T Ei,1 = Ci,1 = Ci,2 = 1
Di,1 = Di,2 = 2p 3*
If ei ≥ qiT
ei + (1 − qi)2p
< qi(ci + T)
2*(1 + qi)2p + (1 + qi)ci + (1 + qi)T Ei,1 = 0 and Ci,1 = Ci,2 = 1
Di,1 = Di,2 = 2p
The fixed cost to make deposits and pay the new card fee is smaller than the cost
to remember to carry the same card for the next period and the risk of losing the
deposit. As a results, visitors were not likely to increase their deposits after the new
card fee was imposed.
Local residents, in contrast, are likely to have high probability of taking a round-
trip in the second day (i.e., large qi). Also, their fixed cost to make deposits to
their MetroCards are likely to be high (i.e., high ci) since their opportunity cost of
missing a train and being late for work is high. The fixed cost tomake deposits and
pay the new card fee is larger than the cost to remember to carry the same card for
the next period and the risk to lose rides fare if they do not actually take rides in the
second day. As a results, local residents are more likely to increase their deposits
after the new card fee was imposed.
n=3 Case
In line with the n = 2 case, when n = 3, riders in region D switched from only
depositing the fare of the first day’s rides to prepaying for rides in the second day
after the new card fee T was introduced. Riders in region E switched from prepay-
ing for rides in the second day to prepaying for rides in the second and third day
after the new card fee was imposed (Figure 1.9.20b). Leftover balances on expired
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cards will increase accordingly.
1.5.3 n=30 Case
When n = 30, according to the model, there should be thirty-one regions rang-
ing from no prepay for future rides to prepay for rides in the next 30 days (Figure
1.9.21). In reality, riders either choose the ”other amount” option and manually
enter $4.5 (or $5) as the desired deposit amount, or choose one of the payment
prompts (i.e., suggested deposit amounts) on Touchscreen (Figure 1.9.22a and
1.9.22c). Therefore, there should be four regions as in Figure 1.9.23a and Figure
1.9.23b, corresponding to the ”other amount” choice, ”the first default choice”,
”the second default choice”, and ”the third default choice”, respectively.
Therefore, instead of Dit ∈ [0, 2np], rider i makes choice of deposit amount
Dit ∈ {5, 10, 20, 40} to her newMetroCard. When purchasing a newMetroCard
with card fee T and take two rides in day 1, rider i’s objective is to choose a fare








When riders are charged a fee for purchasing a new MetroCard, riders in re-
gion A′ switched from choosing ”other amount” choice to the first suggested de-
posit amount ($10); riders in region B′ switched from the first suggested deposit
amount to the second suggested deposit amount ($20); while riders in region C′
switched from the second suggested deposit amount ($20) to the third suggested
deposit amount ($40) (Figure 1.9.23c). Consistent with the predictions of the
model, the number of deposits in suggested amounts jumped up significantly after
the new card fee was imposed (Figure 1.9.24)
1.5.4 Parameter Estimates
This subsection summarizes the constructionof the likelihood function and the es-
timation procedure; complete details are in Appendix D. I use changes of deposits
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in suggested amounts to calibrate the values of three groups of unobservables that
must be integrated out: individual specific unobserved heterogeneity, including ei,
ci, and qi. Computational difficulties in estimation mainly come from the model’s
high dimensional unobserved heterogeneity which requires many evaluations of
the likelihood function.
The estimates for the 7 parameters discussed in the main text are shown in Ta-
ble 1.9.1. Recall that the parameters of the pre-censoring distributions are used
to describe the censored distributions. The price coefficient β is 0.12, which in-
dicates that a price increase from $0.00 to $2.50 per ride decreases usage by 25
percent. The next six parameters characterize the normal distribution of riders’
riding probability qi, fixed cost to purchase MetroCards ci, and card carrying cost
ei. The average rider’s riding probability qi is estimated to be 0.62. The average rid-
ers’ fixed cost ci is estimated to be $1.45, while the average rider’ carrying cost ei is
$0.83. The population standard deviations of qi, ci, and ei (σq, σc, and σe) are 0.34,
$0.56, and $0.53, respectively.
1.5.5 Counterfactual Analysis
Fixed-Price Counterfactual: Impact of Default Choices
The MTA has been criticized for having payment prompts (i.e., default choices of
deposit amounts) on TouchScreen of MetroCard vending machines that do not
give an exact number of rides: If a rider chooses one of the payment prompts on
theTouchscreen, shewill end upwith a card that has leftover change because none
of those suggested amounts (a $9.00 MetroCard with a $.45 bonus, a $19.00 card
with a $.95 bonus, or a $39.00 card with a $1.95 bonus) are divisible by $2.50, the
base fare for every subway ride.
Some people have proposed a software change as shown in Figure 1.9.27. Now
all the payment prompts on Touchscreen give an exact number of rides: a $9.55
MetroCardwith a $.48 bonus gives exactly 4 rides, a $19.05 cardwith a $.95 bonus
gives 8 rides, while a $38.10 card with a $1.91 bonus gives 16 rides.
I simulate the change in expired fare revenue that results from the introduction
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of the $1 new card feewith this newpayment prompts onTouchscreenwhile hold-
ing base fare for every subway ride fixed. I construct this counterfactual simulation
in the sense that I hold fixed the number of riders and their riding patterns. The
model predicts that, even with all the payment prompts give an exact number of
rides, expired fare revenue will still increase by 39.52% ($19.76 million)
Optimal New Card Fee
I simulate the optimal amount of new card fee that maximizes the MTA’s profit
while holding the payment prompts on Touchscreen and base fare for every sub-
way ride fixed. I construct this counterfactual simulation in the sense that I hold
fixed the number of riders and their riding patterns. The model predicts that the
optimal amount of new card fee is $4.35.
1.6 AlternativeMechanisms
This paper provides evidence of the impacts of the new card fee that is consistent
with a rational model highlighting the importance of the cost of effort to remem-
ber to bring the sameMetroCard for future rides, the fixed cost ofmaking deposits
to MetroCards, and consumer uncertainty about future rides. However, transac-
tion cost is not the only possible explanation for the observed increase in deposit
amounts and the forgonebalances on expired cards. This section investigates other
potential theories or mechanisms that might explain the results described above.
1.6.1 Persuasion
The screens of vending machines show three suggested payment amounts ($10,
$20, $40), along with bonuses. This could potentially push riders to make higher
deposits. However, the screen displayed the same $10 and $20 suggested amounts
before and after the card fee went into effect; only the third suggested amount
changed from $50 to $40 (Figure 1.9.22a and 1.9.22c). Since the main changes
in deposit amounts were switching from $5 to $10 and $20 with no changes of the
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$10 and $20 suggested amounts, persuasion, solely, is not likely to account for the
observed changes in new purchases.
1.6.2 Avoidance of Coins
When riders make deposits to MetroCards using cash at vending machines, they
may receive asmany as 20 quarters (i.e., $4) as change if they purchase newMetro-
Cardswith a $10bill andonlymake a deposit of round-trip fare to the card (i.e. $10
- $5 fare cost - $1 new card fee). If some riders prefer not to have a lot of coins as
change, they may start making $10 or $20 cash deposits during new pay-per-ride
card purchases at vending machines.
However, this explanation, solely, cannot explain the changes observed in debit
card payments. Before the new card fee, more than 30% of ridersmade only $5 de-
posits (round-trip fare) when they purchased new pay-per-ride MetroCards (Fig-
ure 1.9.16c). Since $5 has never been one of the suggested deposit amounts on
the screen, this means that many riders used to hit the ”other amount” option and
manually enter $5 as the desired deposit amount. These riders can still choose the
”other amount” option andmanually enter $6 ($5 fare + $1 new card fee) after the
new card fee. But the percentage of $5 deposits dropped to below 20% after the
new card fee (Figure 1.9.16c).
1.6.3 Quick Fix
Some ridersmaywant tomake larger deposits when purchasing new cards because
larger deposits couldminimize (or alleviate) the perceived cost of the new card fee.
For instance, ridersmay want to compensate for the absolutemonetary cost of the
new card fee by bonuses on pay-per-ride deposits. The existence of a quick fix can
largely explain why larger increases on new card purchases were mainly on cards
that had no subsequent refill activities: Before the new card fee, more than 60% of
the deposits on new cards that had no subsequent refill activities were $4.50 (the
fare of a round-trip) while more than 70% of the deposits on new cards with refill
transactions were already at least $10 or $20.
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However, this mechanism is not likely to explain the persistent increase in de-
posit amounts on new cards and forgone balances on expired cards. If riders only
increased their deposit amounts to alleviate the perceived cost of the new card fee
but did not incur utility cost to keep the same card, their forgone balances on lost
or expired cards would increase. Over time, they should decrease their deposit
amounts back to the pre-fee level. It has been three years since the introduction
of the new card fee. I did not observe decrease in deposit amounts or forgone bal-
ances over time.
1.6.4 Commitment Device
Many ridersmay use larger deposits as ameans to push themselves to remember to
carry the same card and avoid paying the new card fee. As the forgone balances on
expired cards increased by 50%, the larger deposits is clearly a failed commitment
device. Literature shows that people stop using a commitment device that does
not work (Brocas and Carrillo 3; Carrillo and Mariotti 6; Vigna and Malmendier
41). If this explanation is the primary one, we should see deposits bounce back to
lower level. It has been three years since the the introduction of the new card fee.
No decrease in deposit amounts or forgone balances was observed.
1.7 Robustness tests
In this section, I perform several robustness tests to further validate the explana-
tions for the findings.
Sample
The same results remain nomatter whether I use the whole sample or sub-samples
(e.g., one week before and after the implementation of the new card fee, or ran-
domly picked stations).
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Minor Decrease in Ridership
There was only a minor decrease in ridership after the imposition of the new card
fee (Figure 1.9.10).
Cross-type switch in purchases of MetroCards
One concernwith interpreting changes in deposit patterns as a response to thenew
card fee is that there may be cross-type switches from pay-per-ride to unlimited-
ride cards or single-ride tickets due to the variations in fare hike across different
types of MetroCards.
Table 1.9.13 lists monthly revenue before and after the new card fee. There was
no significant change in the percent of revenue from pay-per-ride versus that from
time-based cards. Table 1.9.11 andTable 1.9.12 show that the threshold for switch-
ing from pay-per-ride to unlimited-ride cards barely changed after the fare hikes in
March 2013. This suggests that differences in fare hikes across different types of
MetroCards are unlikely to be driving these results. These findings confirm that
there is minimal cross-type switching.
Cross-type Switch from Pay-per-ride to Single-ride Tickets
A seemingly reasonable implication from the imposition of the new card fee is that
the sales of single-ride tickets are likely to rise since some riders may switch from
pay-per-ride to single-ride tickets, especially when they forget their regularMetro-
Cards but need to take a round trip. However, monthly sales of single-ride tickets
actually decreased after the new card fee went into effect.
Cross-type Switch from Pay-per-ride to Time-based Cards
Table 1.9.11 compares the costs of trips using pay-per-ride versus 7-day-unlimited
cards. The red oval circles mark the threshold number of trips needed to switch
from pay-per-ride to 7-day-unlimited before versus after the new card fee imple-
mentation. Before the new card fee, a rider would only save more money buying
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a 7-day-unlimited than buying a pay-per-ride card if he takes more than 14 trips
within one week. After the new card fee, this threshold was 13, only decreasing by
one trip.
Table1.9.12 compares the costs of tripsusingpay-per-ride versus30-day-unlimited
cards. The red oval circles mark the threshold number of trips needed to switch
from pay-per-ride to 30-day-unlimited before versus after the new card fee im-
plementation. Again, the threshold for switching from pay-per-ride to 30-day-
unlimited cards only slightly changed after the fare hikes in March 2013.
NoSignificant Increases inDepositAmountsBeforeversusAfter the
Fare Hike in 2009 or 2015
There may be some concern that changes in deposit patterns are solely due to the
fare hike in 2013. Figure 1.9.31 and 1.9.32 plots the histogram for deposits on
pay-per-rideMetroCard purchases before and after the fare hike in 2009 and 2015,
respectively. For both new and refill purchases, there were barely any changes in
deposit amounts. Hence, the observed changes in deposit patterns after the new
card fee was not likely driven primarily by the $0.25 increase of base fare.
1.8 Implications of theModel
In this section, I discuss implicationsof themodel developedabove. Myevaluation
of newcard fee onMetroCardpurchases could be insightful in other contexts, such
asmobile andonline prepaid services aswell as general purpose reloadable prepaid
cards.
1.8.1 Mobile and Online Prepaid Services
The importance of the cost of effort to remember to carry the same card (ei) and
the fixed cost to make deposits to cards (ci) highlighted in this model may ex-
plain the prevalence of required minimum deposit amounts in the online or mo-
bile prepaid services such as E-ZPass and Skype. When authorities or firms adopt
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online or mobile payments with an automatic deduction from bank accounts or
credit cards, consumers’ fixed cost to make payments ci converges to zero. As a
result, consumers switch from prepaying for future consumption to pay only for
consumption in current period (pay-as-you-go). Tomaintain the benefit from un-
used account balances, most online or mobile prepaid services providers have re-
quired minimum deposit amounts and use suggested deposit amounts to attract
evenmore deposits. For skype credit, the minimum purchase amount is $10 (Fig-
ure 1.9.33a) and consumers can only select from $10 or $25 to buy.
1.8.2 General Purpose Reloadable Cards
Findings in this model are consistent with findings in the prepaid card industry.
Currently, over 23 million U.S. adults use general purpose reloadable cards such
as green dot cards each month. Consumers loaded $672 billion on these cards
in 2013. Since most general purpose reloadable card users are low-income and
excluded from the financial mainstream, they do not have other banking options
(Urahn et al. 38). Most card companies charge a new card fee (or card activation
fee) as high as $9.95. When a prepaid card issuer has market power, a new card
fee (or card activation fee) could push consumers to prepay more for future con-
sumption.
1.9 Discussions andConclusions
How do consumers respond to the imposition of a new card fee? In this paper,
I show how a new card fee for prepaid transit cards induced riders to put more
moneyoncards and losemorewhen these cards expired. I present anovel transaction-
level data set from the public transit system inNewYorkCity that allowsme to an-
alyze changes in deposit amounts and the forgone balance on expired cards. After
the introduction of a $1 new card fee, the net monthly outstanding balance from
transit card deposits increased dramatically, with riders lending an extra $150mil-
lion, on an annual basis, to the MTA. Moreover, over $20 million of the increased
29
balances in the first year were never redeemed and escheated to the MTA when
these cards expired.
There arefivemainempirical findings regarding changes indeposit amounts and
forgone balances on expired cards. First, the changes largely came from new card
purchases, not from refills. Second, the changes were mainly from new cards that
would not have subsequent refill activities, not fromcards that showed subsequent
refill activities. Third, the changes mainly came from cash or debit card payments
rather than fromcredit card payments. Fourth, among cash payments, the changes
weremostly frompaymentsmade at vendingmachines rather than frompayments
made atmanned booths (tellers). Fifth, the response to the new card feewas larger
in low-income neighborhoods than in high-income neighborhoods.
One leading explanation highlights the importance of the cost of effort to re-
member to bring the sameMetroCard for future rides, the fixed cost ofmaking de-
posits toMetroCards, and consumer uncertainty about future rides. WhenMetro-
Cards were free, riders with a low fixed cost of making deposits to MetroCards
chose not to incur the cost of effort to remember to bring the same card for future
days. They deposited only a small amount ofmoney on cards and purchased a new
MetroCard eachperiod if needed. After thenewcard feewas imposed,many riders
switched to refilling existing cards since their cost of effort to remember to carry
the same card was smaller than the new card fee. They started making larger de-
posits to save on the fixed cost ofmaking deposits to cards. Because consumers are
uncertain about future rides, these riders on average had higher leftover balances
after the card expiration dates.
The results of this study are likely to generalize to 8.3 million Americans who
use public transit to go to work. 10.65 billion passenger trips were taken on transit
systems in 2013 (American Public Transportation Association 2014). Therefore,
both in termsofmonetarymagnitude and in termsof population involved, the new
card fee on transit card has a significant economic impact. These findings are also
consistent with findings in the prepaid card industry. Since most general purpose
reloadable card users are low-income and excluded from the financial mainstream,
they do not have other banking options (Urahn et al. 38).
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Thesefindings alsohave implicationabout regressiveways to raisemoney. Mainly
due to data limitations, studies on regressive fees focus on the portion of fee rev-
enue collected from low-income people. Here I provide evidence that whether or
not the card fee itself is regressive, it may push low-income consumers to behave
in ways that cost them money, especially in monopolistic market. The authorities
should take into consideration the possible additional responses from low-income
people when imposing a fee.
Findings in this paper predict that riders’ fixed cost tomake payments converge
to zero with mobile payments and automatic deductions from bank accounts or
credit cards. As a result, riders will switch from prepaying for future consump-
tion to pay only for consumption this period (pay-as-you-go). A natural follow-up
works is to conduct field experiments to examine the effects of mobile payments
on riders’ deposit amounts.
Table 1.9.1: Recent History of MTA Policy Changes
Date Jun 28, 2009 - Dec 30, 2010 - March 3, 2013 - March 22, 2015 -
Dec 29, 2010 March 2, 2013 March 21, 2015
Base fare ($) 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.75
7-day-unlimited ($) 27 29 30 31
30-day-unlimited ($) 89 104 112 116.50
Single-ride 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.00
tickets ($)
$1 Card Fee on new No No c2 Yes* c2 Yes
MetroCard purchase
Bonus for Pay-Per-Ride, 15%($8) 7%($10) 5%($5) 11%($5.50)
%(threshold)
* The main policy change for this paper is the imposition of $1 card fee on
new MetroCard purchases.
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Table 1.9.2: Empirical Features And Possible Explanations
After the new card fee Persuasion of Avoidance Quick Commitment Transaction
Machine of Coins Fix Device Cost
Screen Info
Finding 1
A large drop in number Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
of new MetroCard sold
Finding 2
Monthly outstanding No Yes Yes Yes Yes
balance from pay-per-ride
deposits jumped by 1/3
Finding 3
Increased expired fare revenue No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Finding 4
No decrease in deposit amounts Yes No No No Yes
or forgone balances over time
Finding 5
Increase in deposit amount No Yes Yes Yes Yes
on new purchases
Finding 6
Larger increase in deposits on No No Yes Yes Yes
cash or debit card payments
Finding 7
Larger increase in deposits No Yes Yes Yes Yes
on cards with no subsequent
refill activities
Trivial change in deposit No No Yes Yes Yes
amount on cards with
refill activities
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Table 1.9.3: Monthly Demand for New Cards Before And After the new card fee
(In millions)
Before After
(Jan 2009 to Feb 2013) (Mar 2013 to Jun 2015)
Number Percent Number Percent p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total 7.70 1 2.32 1
(0.55) (0.39)
Pay-per-ride 5.84 0.758 1.826 0.791 <0.0001*
(0.47) (0.011) (0.28) (0.01)
30-day-unlimited 0.58 0.076 0.15 0.063 <0.0001*
(0.055) (0.01) (0.042) (0.01)
7-day-unlimited 1.26 0.163 0.339 0.144 <0.0001*
(0.079) (0.005) (0.076) (0.01)
N 104 104 112 112
Standard deviations in parentheses
Table reports mean values of each variable
∗ p-value of mean difference in percent sales before and after the new card fee was imple-
mented.
Table 1.9.4: Effect of New Card Fee on Daily Total New MetroCard Sales
sale13S[table-format=1.2,table-column-width=25mm] Outcome variable: total
new card sales on daily basis from January 1, 2013 to April 30, 2013 Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 1.9.5: Effect of New Card Fee on Daily New MetroCard Sales By Dif-
ferent Types of Cards
sale23S[table-format=1.2,table-column-width=25mm] Outcome variable: new
card sales on daily basis from January 1, 2013 to April 30, 2013 Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 1.9.6: Effect of New Card Fee on Deposit Amounts: RD Regressions
table10.tex3S[table-format=1.2,table-column-width=20mm] Dependent
variable: deposit amount at new pay-per-ride purchases. Standard Deviation in
parentheses and clustered at station level. The sample is limited to all deposit
transactions made to new pay-per-ride MetroCards from January 1, 2013 to Aril
30, 2013. The coefficients reported here are based on default bandwidth with
local quadratic described in Calonico et. al(2014). + p < 0.1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001
Table 1.9.7: Median Neighborhood Income and Pay-per-ride Deposit
Amounts
mtaspatial3.tex4S[table − format = 1.2, table − column − width = 15mm]Dependentvariable : transaction − leveldepositamountforpay − per − rideMetroCards.Thesampleislimitedtoalldeposittransactionsforpay − per − rideMetroCardsfromJanuary1, 2013toAril30, 2013.StandardDeviationinparenthesesandclusteredatstationlevel.* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 1.9.8: Median Neighborhood Income and Ridership At Station-level
mtaspatial2.tex6S[table − format = 1.2, table − column − width = 10mm]Dependentvariable : weeklyridesfromdifferenttypesofMetroCards.ThesampleislimitedtoweeklyMetroCardswipesfromJanuary2010toMay2015.StandardDeviationinparenthesesandclusteredatstationlevel* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 1.9.9: Welfare Analysis: Cost of Rides for n = 2 Case
No Card Fee With Card Fee Changes in Utility
A −(ci + 2p)− qi(ci + 2p) −(ci + 2p)− ei − qi(ci + 2p) −ei
B −(ci + 2p)− qi(ci + 2p) −(ci + 2p)− qi(ci + 2p + T) −qiT
C −(ci + 2p)− qi(ci + 2p) −(ci + 4p)− ei −ei − c2(1− qi)2pc2+ qici
D −(ci + 4p)− ei −(ci + 4p)− ei No change
Table 1.9.10: Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimate
β Price Sensitivity 0.20
E[qi] Mean of Probability 0.62
σ[qi] Standard Error of Probability 0.34
E[ci] Mean of Fixed Cost 1.45
σ[ci] Standard Error of Fixed Cost 0.56
E[ei] Mean of Carrying Cost 0.83
σ[ei] Standard Error of Carrying Cost 0.53
Table 1.9.11: Comparison of ridership cost Pay-per-ride versus 7-day-
unlimited
Rides Dec 30, 2010 to Mar 2, 2013 Mar 3, 2013 to Mar 21, 2015
7% bonus for every $10 5% bonus for every $5
Pay-per-ride 7-day-unlimited Pay-per-ride 7-day-Unlimited
1 2.25 29 2.5 30
2 4.5 29 5.0 30
... ... ... ... ...
12 25.23 29 28.57 30
13 27.34 29 c2 30.95 30 c2
14 c2 29.44 29 c2 33.33 30
Table 1.9.11 compares the costs of trips using pay-per-ride versus 7-day-
unlimited cards. The red oval circles mark the threshold number of trips needed
to switch from pay-per-ride to 7-day-unlimited before versus after the new card
fee was implemented.
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Table 1.9.12: Comparison of ridership cost Pay-per-ride versus 30-day-
unlimited
Rides Dec 30, 2010 to Mar 2, 2013 Mar 3, 2013 to Mar 21, 2015
7% bonus for every $10 5% bonus for every $5
Pay-per-ride 30-day-unlimited Pay-per-ride 30-day-Unlimited
1 2.25 104 2.5 112
2 4.5 104 5.0 112
... ... ... ... ...
47 98.83 104 111.90 112
48 100.93 104 c2 114.29 112 c2
49 103.04 104 116.67 112
50 c2 105.14 104 c2 119.05 112
Table 1.9.12 compares the costs of trips using pay-per-ride versus 30-day-unlimited
cards. The red oval circles mark the threshold number of trips needed to switch
from pay-per-ride to 30-day-unlimited before versus after the new card fee was im-
plemented.
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Table 1.9.13: Monthly Revenue Before and After the New Card Fee (In
Millions $)
Before After
(Jan 2011 to Feb 2013) (Mar 2013 to Jun 2015)
Value Percent Value Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total 269.47 1 310.00 1
(8.82) (1.36)
Pay-per-ride 159.02 0.59 179.97 0.58





30-day-unlimited 64.81 0.241 69.56 0.225





7-day-unlimited 38.61 0.143 51.96 0.168





Reduced fares 5.63 0.022 6.91 0.021
(0.25) (0.001) (0.40) (0.001)
N 104 104 112 112
Standard deviations in parentheses
Table reports mean values of each variable
Table 1.9.13 shows themonthly revenue from sales of different types ofMetro-
Cards before and after the new card fee. There was no significant change in the
percent of revenue from pay-per-ride versus that from time-based cards.
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Figure 1.9.1: MetroCard Purchase Venues
(a) Vending Machine (b) Manned Booth
Source: Figure 1.9.1a www.fastcompany.com; Figure 1.9.1b Benjamin Kabak
on Flickr
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Figure 1.9.2: First Screen Snapshot on Vending Machine Purchases Before
and After the New Card Fee
(a) Before (b) After
Note: Figure 1.9.2 shows the first screen snapshot of the vending machines
before (1.9.2b) and after (1.9.2b) the new card fee went into effect, respec-
tively.
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Figure 1.9.3: Monthly New MetroCard Sales From January 2009 to June
2015
(a) Total (b) Pay-per-ride
(c) 30-day-unlimited (d) 7-day-unlimited
Note: Figure 1.9.3 plots monthly sales of new MetroCards from January 2009
to June 2015, broken out for different types of MetroCards. The vertical line
marks the month when the new card fee was implemented.
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Figure 1.9.4: Daily Sales of New MetroCards (All Types) from January 1,
2013 to April 30, 2013
(a) Raw (b) Adjusted
Figure 3.0.1a plots daily sales of new MetroCards (all types) from January 1,
2013 to April 30, 2013. Figure 3.0.1b plots residual of daily sales from day of
week fixed effect. The vertical line marks the day when the new card fee was
implemented.
Figure 1.9.5: Daily Sales of New Pay-per-ride MetroCards from January 1,
2013 to April 30, 2013
(a) Raw (b) Adjusted
Note: Figure 1.9.5a plots daily sales of new pay-per-ride MetroCards from
January 1, 2013 to April 30, 2013. Figure 1.9.5b plots residual of daily sales
from day of week fixed effect. The vertical line marks the day when the new
card fee was first imposed
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Figure 1.9.6: Daily Sales of New 7-day-unlimited MetroCards from January
1, 2013 to April 30, 2013
(a) Raw (b) Adjusted
Note: Figure 1.9.6a plots daily sales of new 7-day-unlimited MetroCards from
January 1, 2013 to April 30, 2013. Figure 1.9.6b plots residual of daily sales
from day of week fixed effect. The vertical line marks the day when the new
card fee was first imposed
Figure 1.9.7: Daily Sales of New 30-day-unlimited MetroCards from January
1, 2013 to April 30, 2013
(a) Raw (b) Adjusted
Note: Figure 1.9.7a plots daily sales of new 30-day-unlimited MetroCards from
January 1, 2013 to April 30, 2013. Figure 1.9.7b plots residual of daily sales
from day of week fixed effect. The vertical line marks the day when the new
card fee was first imposed
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Figure 1.9.8: Monthly Outstanding balance from Pay-per-ride Deposits from
January 2008 to April 2015
Note: Figure 1.9.8 plots monthly outstanding balance from pay-per-ride de-
posits from January 2008 to April 2015. The aggregate monthly outstanding
balance that riders carried on their MetroCard is defined as the difference be-
tween the total amount they loaded on the cards and reductions caused by
swipes at turnstiles. The first vertical line (purple) marks the month when
the 2009 fare hike went into effect, the second vertical line (green) marks the
month when the 2010 fare hike went into effect, and the third vertical line
(red) marks the month when the new card fee was first imposed (also the
month when the 2013 fare hike went into effect). The lines plot fitted values
of locally weighted regressions (using Stata’s lowess command) of outstanding
balance on time.
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Figure 1.9.9: Aggregate Forgone Balances on Pay-per-ride MetroCards Ini-
tially Purchased Between January 1, 2013 and April 30, 2013
Note: Figure 1.9.9 plots the aggregate forgone balances on pay-per-ride
MetroCards initially purchased between January 1, 2013 and April 30, 2013.
The forgone balances on pay-per-ride MetroCards is defined as the unspent
balances on expired MetroCards. The vertical line marks the day when the
new card fee was first imposed.
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Figure 1.9.10: Weekly Total Number of MetroCard Swipes from January
2011 to May 2015
Note: Figure 1.9.10 plots weekly total number of MetroCard swipes from Jan-
uary 2011 to May 2015. The vertical line (red) marks the week when the new
card fee went into effect.
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Figure 1.9.11: Monthly Revenue from Pay-per-ride Deposits from January 1,
2011 to April 30, 2015
(a) (b)
Note: Figure 1.9.11a plots monthly revenue of pay-per-ride deposits from Jan-
uary 2011 to April 2015. The vertical line (red) marks the month when the
new card fee went into effect. Figure 1.9.11b plots year-to-year monthly rev-
enue of pay-per-ride deposits from January 2012 to December 2014.
Figure 1.9.12: Deposits on New Pay-per-ride MetroCard Purchases Before
versus After the New Card Fee (From January 1, 2013 To April 30, 2013):
Cumulative Distribution Function
(a) Total (b) One-week
Note: Figure 1.9.12 plots the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for de-
posit amounts on new pay-per-ride MetroCard purchases before versus after
the new card fee. Figure 1.9.12a used all the deposit transactions from Jan-
uary 1, 2013 to April 30, 2013. Figure 1.9.12b plots deposits of purchases
within one week before and after the new card fee.
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Figure 1.9.13: Deposits on New Pay-per-ride MetroCard Purchases Before
and After the New Card Fee (From January 1, 2013 To April 30, 2013): His-
togram
(a) Total (b) One-week
Note: Figure 1.9.13 plots the histogram of deposit amounts on new pay-per-
ride MetroCard purchases before versus after the new card fee. Figure 1.9.13a
used all the deposit transactions from January 1, 2013 to April 30, 2013. Fig-
ure 1.9.13b plots deposits of purchases within one week before and after the
new card fee.
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Figure 1.9.14: Deposits on New Pay-per-ride MetroCard Purchases Before
and After the New Card Fee (From January 1, 2013 To April 30, 2013): Cu-
mulative Distribution Function
(a) No Refills (b) With Refills
Note: Figure 1.9.14 plots the cumulative distribution function for deposits on
new pay-per-ride purchases before and after the new card fee. Figure 1.9.14a
plots the cumulative distribution function for deposits on new pay-per-ride
purchases without subsequent refill activities. Figure 1.9.14b plots the cumu-
lative distribution function for deposits on new pay-per-ride purchases with
subsequent refill activities.
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Figure 1.9.15: Deposits on New Pay-per-ride MetroCard Purchases Before
and After the New Card Fee (From January 1, 2013 To April 30, 2013): His-
togram
(a) No Refills (b) With refills
Note: Figure 1.9.15 plots the histogram for deposits on new pay-per-ride pur-
chases before and after the new card fee (from January 1, 2013 to April 30,
2013). Figure 1.9.15a plots the histogram for deposits on new pay-per-ride
purchases without subsequent refill activities. Figure 1.9.15b plots the his-
togram for deposits on new pay-per-ride purchases with subsequent refill activ-
ities.
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Figure 1.9.16: Changes in Deposits and Forgone Balances on New Pay-per-
ride MetroCards By Different Payment Methods (January 1, 2013 To April 30,
2013): Cumulative Distribution Function
(a) Deposits (Cash) (b) Forgone Balances (Cash)
(c) Deposits (Debit) (d) Forgone Balances (Debit)
(e) Deposits (Credit) (f) Forgone Balances (Credit)
Note: Figure 1.9.16 plots the cumulative distribution function for deposits and
forgone balances on new pay-per-ride MetroCards before and after the new
card fee, broken out for different payment methods. Figure 1.9.16a-1.9.16b
plot the charts for cash purchases. Figure 1.9.16c-1.9.16d plot the charts for
debit card purchases. Figure 1.9.16e-1.9.16f plot the charts for credit card
purchases.
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Figure 1.9.17: Deposits on New Pay-per-ride MetroCard Purchases Before
and After the New Card Fee by Payment Methods (From January 1, 2013 To
April 30, 2013): Histogram
(a) Cash (b) Debit
(c) Credit
Note: Figure 1.9.17 plots the histogram for deposits on new pay-per-ride pur-
chases before and after the new card fee by different payment methods. Fig-
ure 1.9.17a plots the cumulative distribution function for cash deposits on new
pay-per-ride purchases. Figure 1.9.17b plots the histogram for debit-card pay-
ments on new pay-per-ride purchases. Figure 1.9.17c plots the histogram for
credit-card payments on new pay-per-ride purchases.
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Figure 1.9.18: Percent of Cash Payments Across Different Subway Stations
From January 2013 To April 2013
Note: Figure 1.9.18 plots the spatial differences in percent of cash payments
for MetroCard purchases across different census tracts. The census-tract level
per-capita income data is from American Community Survey (ACS) 2009–
2013 (5-Year Estimates)
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Figure 1.9.19: Threshold of Prepaying for Rides in the Second Day For n = 2
Case
(a) No Card Fee (b) With Card Fee
(c) With Card Fee (Changes)
Figure 1.9.19 shows the threshold of prepaying for rides in the second day for
n = 2 case when no card fee is imposed (1.9.19a) and when a card fee is
imposed (1.9.19c), respectively. Before the new card fee was imposed, riders
in region C only deposited the fare of the first day’s rides since the fixed cost
to make deposits in the second day is smaller than the cost to remember to
carry the same card to the second day and the risk of losing the deposit. After
the new card fee was imposed, these riders switched to prepaying for rides in
the second day as the fixed cost to make deposits and pay the new card fee is
larger than the cost to remember to carry the same card for the next period
and the risk of losing the deposit. As a result, they risk losing 2p on expired
MetroCards if they do not actually take rides in the second day (Table 1.9.9).
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Figure 1.9.20: Threshold of Prepaying for Rides in the Second and Third
Day For n = 3 Case
(a) No Card Fee (b) With Card Fee
Figure 1.9.20 shows the threshold of prepaying for rides in the second and
third day for n = 3 case when no card fee is imposed (1.9.20a) and when a
card fee is imposed (1.9.20b), respectively. Before the new card fee was im-
posed, riders in region D only deposited the fare of the first day’s rides since
the fixed cost to make deposits in the second day is smaller than the cost to
remember to carry the same card to the second day and the risk of losing the
deposit. After the new card fee was imposed, these riders switched to prepay-
ing for rides in the second day as the fixed cost to make deposits and pay the
new card fee is larger than the cost to remember to carry the same card for
the next period and the risk of losing the deposit. As a result, they risk losing
2p on expired MetroCards if they do not actually take rides in the second day.
Analogously, riders in region E switched from prepaying for rides in the second
day to prepaying for rides in the second and third day after the new card fee
was imposed.
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Figure 1.9.21: Threshold of Prepaying for Rides in Future Days For n = 30
Case (No Card Fee)
Note: For the n = 30 case, according to the model, there will be thirty-one
regions ranging from no prepay for future rides (region A) to prepay for rides
in the next 30 days (region Z) when no card fee is charged for new MetroCard
purchases.
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Figure 1.9.22: Default Choices of Deposit Amounts on Vending Machine
Screen Before and After the New Card Fee
(a) Screen Before (b) Cumulative Distribution Before
(c) Screen After (d) Cumulative Distribution After
Note: Figure 1.9.22a and 1.9.22c show the suggested deposit amounts on
vending machine screen before and after the new card fee went into effect,
respectively. Figure 1.9.22b and 1.9.22d plot the cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF) for deposit amounts on new pay-per-ride MetroCards before and
after the new card fee was imposed, respectively.
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Figure 1.9.23: Default Choices of Deposit Amounts For n = 30 Case
(a) No Card Fee
(b) With Card Fee
(c) With Card Fee (Changes)
Figure 1.9.23 shows the threshold of choosing different deposit amounts for
n = 30 case when no card fee is imposed (1.9.23a) and when a card fee is
imposed (1.9.23b), respectively. Riders in region A′ switched from choosing
“Other Amounts” to choosing “1st default choice ($10)” after the new card
fee was imposed. Riders in region B′ switched from choosing “1st default
choice ($10)” to choosing “2nd default choice ($20)” after the new card fee
was imposed. Riders in region C′ switched from choosing “2nd default choice
($20)” to choosing “3rd default choice ($40)” after the new card fee was im-
posed.
57
Figure 1.9.24: Daily Total Number of Pay-per-ride MetroCard Purchases
From January 1, 2013 To April 30 2013 By Deposit Amounts
(a) ˜$5 (b) ˜$10
(c) ˜$20 (d) $40˜$50
Note: Figure 1.9.24a plots daily total number of MetroCard purchases (new
and refills) from January 1, 2013 to April 30, 2013. Figure 1.9.24b plots resid-
ual of daily total number of MetroCard purchases (new and refills) from day
of week fixed effect. The vertical line marks the day when the new card fee
was implemented.
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Figure 1.9.25: Changes in Average Deposit Amounts For Pay-per-ride Metro-
Cards Linked to the Same Rider Using MetroCard Trade-in and Trade-out
Data (January 1, 2013 To December 31, 2013)
(a) ˜$5 Deposit Amounts Before the
New Card Fee
(b) ˜$10 Deposit Amounts Before the
New Card Fee
Note: Figure 1.9.25a and 1.9.25b show average deposit amounts for pay-per-
ride MetroCards linked to the same rider using MetroCard trade-in and trade-
out data, by ˜$5 and ˜$10 average deposit amounts before the new card fee
was implemented, respectively. X-axis shows the order of MetroCards pur-
chased: the number 1 represents the first MetroCard purchased by a rider af-
ter the new card fee was introduced, the number -1 represents the last Metro-
Card purchased by the same rider before the new card fee was implemented,
and so on.
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Figure 1.9.26: Changes in Deposit Amounts After the New Card Fee For
Pay-per-ride MetroCards Linked to the Same Rider Using MetroCard Trade-in
and Trade-out Data (January 1, 2013 To December 31, 2013): Cumulative
Distribution Function
(a) ˜$5 Deposit Amounts Before the
New Card Fee
(b) ˜$10 Deposit Amounts Before the
New Card Fee
Note: Figure 1.9.26a and 1.9.26b show cumulative distribution function for
deposit amounts after the new card fee, by ˜$5 and ˜$10 average deposit
amounts before the new card fee was implemented, respectively.
Figure 1.9.27: Proposed Default Choices of Deposit Amounts on Touch-
screen
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Figure 1.9.28: Monthly Sales of Single-ride Tickets From January 2011 To
June 2015
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Figure 1.9.29: Daily Total Number of MetroCard Purchases From January 1,
2013 To April 30, 2013: New and Refills
(a) 7-day-unlimited Raw (b) 7-day-unlimited Adjusted
(c) 30-day-unlimited Raw (d) 30-day-unlimited Adjusted
Note: Figure 1.9.29a plots daily total number of 7-day-unlimited MetroCard
purchases (new and refills) from January 1, 2013 to April 30, 2013. Figure
1.9.29b plots residual of daily total number of 7-day-unlimited MetroCard
purchases (new and refills) from day of week fixed effect. Figure 1.9.29c plots
daily total number of 30-day-unlimited MetroCard purchases (new and refills)
from January 1, 2013 to April 30, 2013. Figure 1.9.29d plots residual of daily
total number of 30-day-unlimited MetroCard purchases (new and refills) from
day of week fixed effect. The vertical line marks the day when the new card
fee was implemented
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Figure 1.9.30: Deposits on Pay-per-ride MetroCard Purchases Before and Af-
ter the 2009 Fare Hike (From May 1, 2009 To August 30, 2009): Cumulative
Distribution Function
(a) New (b) Refill
Note: Figure 1.9.30 plots the cumulative distribution function for deposits on
pay-per-ride MetroCard purchases before and after the 2009 fare hike. Figure
1.9.30a plots cumulative distribution function for deposits on new pay-per-ride
MetroCard purchases from May 1, 2009 to August 30, 2009. Figure 1.9.30b
plots the cumulative distribution function for deposits on pay-per-ride refills
from May 1, 2009 to August 30, 2009.
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Figure 1.9.31: Deposits on Pay-per-ride MetroCard Purchases Before and
After the 2009 Fare Hike (From May 1, 2009 to August 30, 2009): Histogram
(a) New (b) Refill
Note: Figure 1.9.31 plots the histogram for deposits on pay-per-ride Metro-
Card purchases before and after the 2009 fare hike. Figure 1.9.31a plots the
histogram for deposits on new pay-per-ride purchases from May 1, 2009 to
August 30, 2009. Figure 1.9.31b plots the histogram for deposits on pay-per-
ride refills from May 1, 2009 to August 30, 2009.
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Figure 1.9.32: Deposits on Pay-per-ride MetroCard Purchases Before and Af-
ter the 2015 Fare Hike (From January 1, 2015 To May 31, 2015): Cumulative
Distribution Function
(a) New (b) Refill
Note: Figure 1.9.32 plots the cumulative distribution function for deposits on
pay-per-ride MetroCard purchases before and after the 2015 fare hike. Figure
1.9.32a plots cumulative distribution function for deposits on new pay-per-ride
MetroCard purchases from January 1, 2015 to May 31, 2015. Figure 1.9.32b
plots the cumulative distribution function for deposits on pay-per-ride refills
from January 1, 2015 to May 31, 2015.
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Figure 1.9.33: Implication of the Models
(a) Skype (b) Reloadable Debit Card
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1.10 Appendices
1.10.1 A General Model where qi Depends on the Base Fare of a Ride
The marginal utility of a subway or bus ride for rider i on day t is rit. β is the
price sensitivity parameter that determines how sensitive riding choices are to the
marginal price of an additional ride. Here marginal price is vi for rider i. For each
rider i, rit is uniformly distributed from 0 to 1β ∼ U(0,
1
β). On day t, the probability
of actually taking a round-trip for rider i is:
qi = qiq̂(vi) (1.7)
where q̂(v) = 1− βv is the fraction of riding opportunities worth more than vi
per ride. Over the course of an n-day period, actual number of rides taken by rider
i is:
N̂i = N̂(vi, qi,Ni) = Niq̂(vi) (1.8)








Figure 1.10.1 shows the riding threshold v and resulting riding choice in relation
to a rider’s realized inverse demand curve. Assume riders are risk neutral and they
have quasilinear utility. The marginal value of a dollar is normalized to one. Rider
i’s money-metric utility from riding subways and buses on day t ≥ 2 is:
Uit = qi(rit − Dit − Eitei − Citci − T(1− Ei,t−1)) (1.10)
When purchasing a new MetroCard with card fee T and take two rides in day
1, rider i’s objective is to choose a fare deposit policy {Dit, Eit,Cit} that maximizes
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Figure 1.10.1: Inverse Demand Curve and Riding Threshold
expected total utility:












qi(Dit +Eitei +Citci +T(1−Ei,t−1)))]
(1.12)
Stylized Facts Relevant to Modeling Rides Choices
Three features of thedata are important to accuratelymodel rides choices by riders.
First, riders’ usage choices are price sensitive. Second, riders’ usage choices are
made while riders are uncertain about the ex post marginal price. Third, riders
are inattentive to the remaining balance of their MetroCards. These three stylized
facts motivate my assumption that, rather than choosing a precise quantity, riders
choose riding thresholds and proceed to take all rides valued above the threshold.
Rider price sensitivity is clearly illustrated by a sharp decrease in single-ride
ticket riding volume when the base fare for a ride increased (Figure 1.9.28). Two
pieces of evidence demonstrate rider uncertainty about ex post marginal price.
First, given clear sensitivity to marginal price, we would expect to see most rid-
68
ers using all the money in their MetroCards. Figure 1.9.16b shows more than 82
percent MetroCards had leftover balances at expiration, which is consistent with
similar findings in the contexts of cellular phone service (Grubb andOsborne 19),
electricity consumption (Borenstein 1), and labor supply (Saez 31). Hence the
standard model (Cardon and Hendel 2001; Reiss and White 2005), which as-
sumes perfect consumer foresight, fits the MetroCard data poorly.
Evidence for inattention comes from in-person surveys of riders I conducted
as they exited subway stations. These surveys were conducted at forty-two sub-
way stations in Manhattan, Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens. The survey yielded a
response rate of 91 percent for a total of 8,346 respondents. Riders were asked
whether they knew the current balances of their MetroCards. Out of the 8,346
respondents, 99.7% riders did not give the accurate balances of their MetroCards.
1.10.2 Rides Choices
In line with the approach taken by [19] and [1], I assume that riders are uncertain
about the ex postmarginal pricewhenmaking riding choices. She chooses a riding
threshold vi based on her beliefs about qi. During the course of the month, rider i
is inattentive and does not track usage but takes all rides valued above vi. Taking all
rides above the constant threshold vi is the optimal strategy of an inattentive rider
who does not track usage and hence cannot update her beliefs about the marginal
price of the next ride. (It is analogous to an electricity consumer setting a thermo-
stat rather than choosing a quantity of kilowatt hours.)
Conditional on choosing pay-per-ride MetroCards, rider i chooses her riding
threshold vi tomaximize her expected utility conditional onher information about
ci, ei, and qi. Given new card feeT, the base fare per ride p, and demand in equation
(1.9), the optimal threshold derived in Appendix B.1 is uniquely characterized by
equation (1.13)
vi = pPr(Ni ≥ 0|ei; ci; qi)
E[Ni|Ni ≥ 0; ei; ci; qi]
E[Ni|ei; ci; qi]
(1.13)
Here the calling threshold vi = v = p. Note that choosing threshold vi is equiv-
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alent to choosing a target riding quantity N̂Ti = E[Ni]q̂(vi), which is implemented
with endogenous error (Ni−E[Ni])q̂(vi). Importantly, riders are aware of their in-




HowLocal Alcohol Access Affects Birth
Outcomes: Evidence fromTexas
2.1 Introduction
In the past four decades, one of the major goals of US public policy has been to
reduce the health, safety, and criminal risks associated with alcohol abuse. A num-
ber of policies are designed to restrict the alcohol consumption. Some, such as the
minimum legal drinking age (MLDA), and preliminary-breath-test laws, have be-
come noticeably more stringent in the past 30 years. An assumption underlying
these social policies is that alcohol-related problems and behaviour can be con-
trolled by restricting the availability of alcoholic beverages. An extensive empirical
literature focuses on the impact of these polices on alcohol-related outcomes such
as motor vehicle accidents, Driving Under the Influence, and violent crimes. For
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example, studies suggest that increases in federal or state excise taxes on alcohol
discourage heavy drinking and reduce motor vehicle fatalities (Coate and Gross-
man 10, Grossman 18, Laixuthai and Chaloupka 23, Mullahy and Sindelar 28).
Research also concludes that changes in minimum drinking age law significantly
reduced alcohol-related accident fatalities. Ironically, while these laws were being
tightened, local alcohol control policies at city and county levels were relaxed in
many parts of the country. After the repeal of Prohibition in 1933, 34 states passed
local option laws, where county and municipal governments govern alcohol poli-
cies in terms of alcohol availability and distribution, mostly by popular vote.
Restricting alcohol availability at the local level may be a plausible prevention
strategy for several reasons. Light tomoderate drinkers, rather than alcoholics, are
believed to contribute disproportionately to a community’s alcohol-related prob-
lems (Bruun et al. 4, Room 29). Curbing all community members’ alcohol con-
sumption, not just consumption by the heaviest alcohol abusers, may decrease
alcohol-related problems (Rose et al. 30). However, as local alcohol restrictions
generally limit the availability of alcohol, these law changes also significantly in-
crease the travel distance required to obtain the alcohol, change where the alcohol
is consumed and change the type of alcohol consumed. Hence, the overall effect
of local alcohol access policies is ambiguous.
In this paper, I examine the causal effects of local access to alcohol on birth
outcomes by comparing municipalities where referenda on legalizing liquor sales
passed and failed by narrowmargins. My results indicate thatmunicipalitieswhich
were studied experienced higher incidence of low birth weight after legalizing the
local sale of alcohol to the general public.
In 26 states, alcohol restrictions differ across counties and municipalities (Al-
abama,Alaska, Arkansas, Florida,Georgia, Illinois, Kansas,Kentucky,Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York,NorthCarolina,Ohio,Oregon, Pennsylvania, SouthDakota,Tennessee,Texas,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin). A dry community is a community whose
government forbids the sale of alcoholic beverages. Awet community is a commu-
nity with no restrictions on local liquor sales. Amoist community is a community
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on the “middle ground” between a dry community and a wet community. Amoist
community allows alcohol to be sold in certain situations, but has limitations on
alcohol sales that a normal ”wet” community would not have. Some prohibit on-
premises sale, some prohibit off-premises sale, and some prohibit both.
The only option for residents of dry areas is to go to areas without alcohol re-
strictions, which can entail large distances and associated time costs, or risk incar-
ceration through the illegal production of alcohol. Many dry communities do not
prohibit the mere consumption of alcohol, which could potentially cause a loss of
profits and taxes from the sale of alcohol to their residents in “wet” areas. Their
main argument against alcohol sales is that unrestricted alcohol consumption in
wet status may cause social andmoral degradation, which in turn would lead to an
increase in crime.
Local alcohol control policieshave receivedmuch less attention thanother alcohol-
relatedpolicies fromthemainstreammedia andhavebeenexamined less frequently
in the literature. Currently, there are thousands of dry communities across the
United States with about 18,000,000 people in the 10% of the area of the US that
is dry (Hanson 2000). Almost one-half of the counties in Mississippi are dry with
their own prohibition against the production, advertising, sale, distribution, or
transportation of alcoholic beverages within their boundaries (Hanson 2000). As
local prohibition affects a large portion of population living in dry areas, most of
which with disadvantaged economic status, study of this policy is critical for local
social outcomes such as alcohol-related accidents, alcohol-involved violent crimes,
as well as maternal drinking during pregnancy.
This paper makes two contributions to the existing literature. The primary in-
novation of this paper is to examine the causal effect of local alcohol access (i.e.,
“wet” communities) on alcohol-related outcomes. Local option elections deter-
mine the types of alcoholic beverages whichmay be sold and how they can be sold
by counties, cities, or individual justice of the peace precincts. With universal 50%
winning voting share threshold, close losers and closewinners of local option elec-
tions provides quasi-random variation in winner status that can be used to over-
come the endogeneity of local alcohol sales restrictions, since for narrowly decided
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races the outcome is unlikely to be correlated with other distinct characteristics as
long as there is some unpredictable component of the ultimate vote.
Second, while the existing literature of local prohibition focuses on outcomes
such as alcohol-related crimes and vehicle crashes, this paper examines the effect
on birth outcomes, especially birth weight. Birth weight is the single most impor-
tant indicator of infant health. It is a significant predictor of infant mortality and
morbidity and of health and learning disabilities in later life. (see Currie and Cole
[1991] for references). Babies born with low birth weight are more likely than
babies born at a normal weight to have health conditions, including respiratory
distress syndrome and bleeding in the brain as newborns and diabetes and obesity
later in life. When a community goes from “dry” to “wet”, there may be a higher
risk of maternal drinking during pregnancy since buying liquor locally becomes
easier. Drinking alcohol during pregnancy can result in embryonic developmen-
tal abnormalities such as low birth weight.
2.2 Data
In this paper, I study the link between local restrictions on liquor sales and birth
outcomes among local residents. I rely on two broad sources of data to identify:
(1) date and location of local option elections aswell as the number of vote for and
against the issues voted on; (2) newborns’ characteristics such as birth weight and
mother’s characteristics.
2.2.1 Local Option Elections
The first source of data (and the reason I focus on Texas) is annual local option
election data drawn fromTexas Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC)Annual
reports. Thedata include date of elections, alcoholic issues thatwere voted for, city
and/or county of the election, number of vote for and against the issues, required
vote shares for passage of the issues, and dry/wet status before and after the elec-
tion. Our sample includes local option elections in counties and municipalities in
Texas between 1979 and 2003.
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Table 1 describes the number of local option elections observed between 1979
and 2003. Over this 24-year-period, therewere 310 referenda, all trying to go from
dry to wet. In total, 87 of the 254 counties in Texas were dry at the start of the
period in 1979, and 34 of these legalized some type of alcohol sales by 2003. There
were 32 other changes in which already non-dry counties further relaxed alcohol
control policies. Figure 2.2.1 shows the yearly number of local option elections
between 1979 and 2003. Although there were elections about alcohol access laws
over the entire period, the majority of elections took place before 1990 and after
2000.
Figure 2.2.1: Number of Referenda By Year, 1979-2003 (Total 310)
2.2.2 Vital Statistics Records
The Vital Statistics Records, collected by Texas Department of State Health Ser-
vices, correspond to 9.6 million babies born in hospitals within the 5,513 munic-
ipalities in Texas from 1979 to 2003. I only include newborns to mothers who
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reside in Texas1. The final analysis of this paper will use a panel of newborns ap-
pearing within two years before to six years after each local option election, reduc-
ing the sample to 279,270 birth records. The average birth weight in Texas for the
period of study was 3,324 grams, and 7.04 percent of births were low birth weight.
The working dataset merges Vital Statistics Records with local option election
data by mother’s municipality of residence. Further details are given in a data ap-
pendix available from the authors on request. Data on birth weight are compara-
tively accurate.
2.3 Model
In this section I describe my regression discontinuity design. I show in a cross-
sectional framework how a RD design approximates a randomized experiment.
Suppose that municipality j considers a local option election to legalize the sale
of alcoholic beverages and that this proposal receives vote share vj (relative to the
required threshold v∗). Let bj = 1(vj ≥ v∗)be adummy indicator for local alcohol
access. Suppressing time-related considerations, we can write some outcome yj
(incidence of low birth weight, for example) as
yj = α + bjβ + μj,
where β is the causal effect of local alcohol access and μj represents all other
determinants of the outcome (with E[μj]=0).
In general, the election outcome may be correlated with other municipal char-
acteristics that influence local alcohol consumption and alcohol-related outcomes
(i.e., E[μjbj] ̸= 0). If so, a simple regression of yj on bj will yield a biased estimate of
β. However, as Lee (2008) points out, as long as there is some unpredictable ran-
dom component of the vote, a narrowly decided election approximates a random-
ized experiment. In other words, the correlation between the election outcome
and unobserved municipal characteristics can be kept arbitrarily close to zero by
1I do not have data on newborns outside Texas to mothers who reside in Texas
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focusing on sufficiently close elections.
Therefore, one can identify the causal effect of measure passage by comparing
municipalities that barelywon an election (the “treatment group”)with others that
barely failed an election (the “control group”). That is, if vj is the vote share and v∗
is the threshold required for passage, unobserved local characteristics μj may vary
with vj but should be similar for municipalities with vj = v∗ + ε and vj = v∗ − ε
(for small ε). Formally, the required assumption is that E[μj|vj] is continuous at
vj = v∗. Now we can write
E[yj|vj] = α + E[bj|vj]β + E[μj|vj] = α + bjβ + E[μj|vj],






I focus on an implementation of the RD strategy that involves approximating
the regression functions above and below the cutoff by means of weighted poly-
nomial regressions with weights computed by applying a kernel function on the
distance of each observation’s score to the cutoff. I present these kernel-based es-
timator using alternative bandwidth selectors and polynomial orders, as well as
bias-corrected estimates per Calonico et al (Forthcoming) (henceforth CCT).
To implement this, I begin by identifying each (j, t) combination with an elec-
tion. I then select observations frommunicipality j in months t-24 through t + 72.
Where amunicipality hasmultiple elections in the samemonth, the same calendar
month observation is usedmore than once. Specifically, assuming a homogeneous
effect of the local option election passage on birth outcomes with universal 50%
voting share for winning:
Yijt = α + γ1{vj ≥ v∗}+ a(t) + Xij + μij (2.1)
where i indexed individuals and j indexed municipalities, Yij denoted the out-
come of interest (for example, low birth weight) for individual i in city j, vj was
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the voting share for local option election in city j, v∗ was the distinct voting share
for winning a local option election (i.e., 50%), a(.) is a flexible function of voting




ance of Treatment and Control Groups
My empirical strategy is to use close elections to approximate a true experiment.
This requires that legalization of alcohol be as good as randomly assigned, condi-
tional onhaving a close election. In this section, I consider tests of this assumption.
I examine three diagnostics for the validity of the RD quasi-experiment, based on
the distribution of the share of voters for alcohol sales, preelection differences in
mean characteristics, and differences in preelection trends. Tests of the balance of
outcome variable means and trends before the election are possible only because
of the panel structure of our data and provide particularly convincing evidence re-
garding the approximate randomness of measure passage.
Figure 2.4.1 shows a histogram of vote shares for local option elections among
municipalities inTexas from1979 to2003. Discontinuous changes indensity around
the threshold can be an indication of endogenous sorting around this threshold,
which would violate the RD assumptions (McCrary 2008). I see no evidence of
such changes. I then follow McCrary’s test and show that the density just to the
left of the cutoff is statistically indistinguishable from the density just to the right
of the cutoff (McCrary 2008).
Figure 2.4.2 presents graphical analyses of mean municipal incidence (proba-
bility) of low birth weight by the margin of victory or defeat, for births in 1-12
months (left panel) and in 13-24 months (right panel) before the election. I show
average outcomes in one-percentage-point bins defined by the vote share relative
to the threshold. Thus, the leftmost point represents measures that failed by be-
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Figure 2.4.1: Histogram of Voting Shares in Local Option Elections, 1979-
2003
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tween nine and ten percentage points, the next measures that failed by eight to
nine points, and so on. As expected, there is no sign of a discontinuity in probabil-
ity of low birth weight for newborns before the election.
Figure 2.4.2: Percent of Low Birth Weight Newborns, by the Share of Voters
For Alcohol Sales, One Year and Two Years Before Election
(a) 13-24 Months Before (b) 1-12 Months Before
Notes: Graph shows percent of low birth weight for births in 1-12 months (left
panel) and in 13-24 months (right panel) before the local option election, by
the share of voters for alcohol sales. Local Option elections are grouped into
bins one percentage point wide: measures that passed by between 0.001% and
1% are assigned to the 1 bin; those that failed by similar margins are assigned
to the -1 bin. The solid dots plot “raw” percent of low birth weight, along
with the fitted values of a locally weighted regression calculated within each
bin.
Columns (1)–(2) of Table 2.4.1 present regressions of birth weight, mother’s
marriage status, andpercentageof childrenbornbymothers belowage21 variables
measured in the year before alcohol referendum, on an indicator for whether the
local option election was passed. The specifications are estimated from a sample
that includes only observations from the year before the election. The first column
controls for month of year effects and the required threshold. It reveals large pre-
measure differences in some outcomes. The second column adds a quadratic poly-
nomial in the measure vote share. Comparing communities that barely passed an
election with communities that barely failed eliminates the significant estimates,
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shrinking two of the point estimates substantially.
Columns (3)–(4) in Table 2.4.1 repeat my two first specifications, taking as the
dependent variable the value in each outcome in the year t−2 (i.e., in two years
before alcohol referendum). Although the model without controls shows some
differences in trends between communities that pass and fail measures, these are
eliminated when I include controls for the vote share. Overall, there seems to be
little cause for concern about the approximate randomness of themeasure passage
indicator in our RD framework. Once I control for a quadratic in themeasure vote
share, measure passage is not significantly correlated with pretreatment trends of
any of the outcomes I examine.
Table 2.4.1: RD Estimates of the Local Alcohol Access on Birth Weight:
Pre-elections
Pretrend.tex9S[table-format=1,table-column-width=20mm] Each entry comes
from a separate regression. Columns (1)-(2) report estimated alcohol effects on
outcome levels the year before the election; columns (3)-(4) report estimated
effects on outcome levels two years before the election. Samples in columns (1)
and (3) include observations from the year before each local option election.
Samples in columns (2) and (4) consist of observations from two years before
each local option election. The specification in these columns is equation 3.1,
with indicators for each month of year, and indicator of gender, an indicator for
measure passage, and a quadratic in the share of votes for alcohol sales. Sample
sizes vary with availability of dependent variable. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the school district
level. - 0.1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
2.4.2 Intent-to-Treat Effects on Birth Weight
Figure 2.4.3 presents graphical analyses ofmeanmunicipal incidence (probability)
of low birth weight by the margin of victory or defeat, for births in 1-12 months
(leftpanel) and in13-24months (right panel) after the election. Formunicipalities
where the measure just failed, there was no significant changes in the incidence of
low birth weight. By contrast, after the election, municipalities where themeasure
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just passed saw a significant increase in the incidence of low birth weight. It is
important to note that this result is obtained without adopting any controls. That
is, I am only analyzing a simple difference between pre- and post-election. Notice,
however, that as the election becomes less random (i.e. the local option election
wins by amargin of more than 5 percent), the change in the incidence of low birth
weight returns to zero. This highlights the importance of using quasi-experimental
methodology to deal with endogeneity.
Table 2.4.2 reports the results of my regression discontinuity estimates, which
are consistent with the information displayed in Figure 2.4.3: For municipalities
where the measure just passed, the changes in local restriction on local sales (i.e.,
going from “dry” to “wet”) highered the incidence of low birth weight by 4.54%
for babies born within 12 months after the elections. The incidence of low birth
weight rose by 4.45% for babies born 13-24months after the elections. In contrast,
there is no significant change inmother’s marriage status or percentage of children
born by mothers below age 21 after the elections.
Table 2.4.2: RD Estimates of the Local Alcohol Access on Birth Weight:
Post-elections
Posttrend.tex9S[table-format=1,table-column-width=20mm] Each entry comes
from a separate regression. Columns (1)-(2) report estimated alcohol effects on
outcome levels the year after the election; columns (3)-(4) report estimated
effects on outcome levels two years after the election. Samples in columns (1)
and (3) include observations from the year after each local option election.
Samples in columns (2) and (4) consist of observations from two years after each
local option election. The specification in these columns is equation 3.1, with
indicators for each month of year, and indicator of gender, an indicator for
measure passage, and a quadratic in the share of votes for alcohol sales. Sample
sizes vary with availability of dependent variable. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the school district
level. + 0.1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Figure 2.4.3: Percent of Low Birth Weight Newborns, by the Share of Voters
For Alcohol Sales, One Year and Two Years After Election
(a) 1-12 Months After (b) 13-24 Months After
Notes: Graph shows percent of low birth weight for births in 1-12 months (left
panel) and in 13-24 months (right panel) after the local option election, by
the share of voters for alcohol sales. Local Option elections are grouped into
bins one percentage point wide: measures that passed by between 0.001% and
1% are assigned to the 1 bin; those that failed by similar margins are assigned
to the -1 bin. The solid dots plot “raw” percent of low birth weight, along
with the fitted values of a locally weighted regression calculated within each
bin.
2.5 Discussions
From the results, it is clear that municipalities which were studied experienced
higher incidence of low birth weight after legalizing the local sale of alcohol to the
general public. The incidence of low birth weight rose by 4.5% for babies born
within two years after the elections. Among all possible explanations, the lead-
ing candidate is maternal drinking: When a community goes from “dry” to “wet”,
there may be a higher risk of maternal drinking during pregnancy since it is easier
to purchase liquor locally. This mechanism is strongly supported when we look
at births within 10 months (i.e., babies conceived just before an election) after a
community became wet.
Figure 2.5.1 presents graphical analyses ofmeanmunicipal incidence (probabil-
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ity) of low birth weight by themargin of victory or defeat, for births in 1-9months
after the election. For municipalities where the measure just failed, there was no
significant changes in the incidence of low birth weight. By contrast, after the elec-
tion, municipalities where themeasure just passed saw a significant increase in the
incidenceof lowbirthweight. This result ismost likely drivenbymaternal drinking
during pregnancy. Meanwhile, there is no significant change in mother’s marriage
status or percentage of children born by mothers below age 21 after the elections.
These findings provide additional evidence indicating that the estimated impact of
local prohibition is not driven by unobserved factors coinciding with the policy or
by general family-specific factors.
Figure 2.5.1: Percent of Low Birth Weight Newborns, by the Share of Voters
For Alcohol Sales, Within Ten Months After Election
Notes: Graph shows percent of low birth weight for births in 1-9 months af-
ter the local option election, by the share of voters for alcohol sales. Local
Option elections are grouped into bins one percentage point wide: measures
that passed by between 0.001% and 1% are assigned to the 1 bin; those that
failed by similar margins are assigned to the -1 bin. The solid dots plot “raw”
percent of low birth weight, along with the fitted values of a locally weighted
regression calculated within each bin.
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2.6 Conclusion
My empirical analysis differs from the existing empirical literature by exploiting a
quasi experimental design to consider the causal effect of local alcohol sales (i.e.,
“wet” communities) on birth outcomes, especially birth weight. To my knowl-
edge, no previous study has estimated the effects of local prohibition on birth
outcomes and the vast majority of previous studies are correlational. This study
provides results that are particularly relevant to an effort to combat Fetal Alco-
hol Spectrum Disorder (FASD). This paper also contributes to the broader and
rapidly growing literature interested in the prenatal determinants of medium and
long-term outcomes in several ways.
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TheCausal Effect of Institutional
Discrimination onHealth: Evidence from
Hukou System inChina
Interest in the impact of institutional discrimination on health outcomes has in-
creaseddramatically. Literature suggests that institutional discriminationproduces
societal-level conditions that constrain theopportunities, resources, andwell-being
of disadvantaged groups (Chan and Zhang 7; Grey 17; Li et al. 25). For instance,
one study showed that LGB respondents living in states that passed antigay mar-
riage amendments in 2006 had higher psychological distress than did LGB indi-
viduals in states without such an amendment on the ballot (Li et al. 25). Another
study has shown that segregation, as one measure of institutional discrimination,
is positively associated with mortality among adult African Americans while ac-
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counting for other possible confounding variables (Shen and Huang 34). Since
research hasmostly been done in the western context where social segregation has
already been established, it is difficult to isolate the effect of initial social segrega-
tion on health outcomes.
In this paper, I examine the causal effect of institutional discriminationonhealth
by exploiting a 1964 change in household registration system (hukou) in China,
which caused a nationwide discrimination against rural dwellers. In 1964, the cen-
tral government enforced the hukou system, which enables institutional discrima-
tion against rural dwellers in many aspects. Hukou was (and is) ascribed at birth
based upon one’s mother’s hukou status, and could not be altered easily. Urban
dwellers were given a non-agricultural (urban) hukou status, with which they are
allocated food, housing, and other social benefits accordingly. In contrast, rural
residents were given an agricultural (rural) hukou status and were excluded from
these services and welfare entitlements. The 1964 change in the hukou system
started to put tight control on domestic migration. Thereafter, movement from
rural to urban areas became virtually impossible.
The 1964 change in the hukou system provided a particularly credible source of
exogenous variation in administrative discrimination. I explore the effects of this
change using a large, on-going national dataset from the China Health and Nutri-
tion Survey (CHNS). Figure 3.0.1a illustrates the remarkable effect that this leg-
islation change had on lowering the proportion of urban hukou residents. Among
people born before 1965, there were more than 50% of urban hukou residents.
Following the 1964 change in hukou policy, the fraction of urban hukou residents
suddenly fell to about 40%. The same sharpdrop inproportionof urbanhukou res-
idents was confirmed in the National Population Census of 1990 (Figure 3.0.1b).
I use this discontinuity in the proportion of urban hukou residents to identify
the causal effect of institutional discrimination anchored in the hukou system on
health. This is done by comparing the health of people born just before and after
the legislation change in the hukou system. Identification comes from the assump-
tion that potential outcomes are smooth around the cutoff (i.e., birth year 1965).
The regression-discontinuity (RD) design estimates suggest that urban hukou cit-
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izens have much better chances of being in good health. The deleterious effect of
rural hukou on health possibly works throughmechanisms of labor disparity, lim-
ited access to healthcare, and deprivation of quality education.
The structure for this paper is as follows. The next section gives relevant back-
ground information on the origin and changes of the hukou system in China, ex-
plaining the regression-discontinuity design. There will then be a description of
the data used in this analysis. The section of method and results will provide the
empirical method and results, which are carefully interpreted in the section of dis-
cussions. The last section is the conclusion.
Background Information onHukou System
The hukou system requires individuals to register with local authorities to gain res-
idency, thereby determining where people can live and work. It was first started in
cities in 1951 and extended to the rural areas in 1955 (Yang and Zhou 42). In the
early years of the system, it served largely as a monitoring, not a control, mecha-
nism of population movements.
In the 1950s, there were several stimuli for rural-to-urban migration. The most
influential stimulus lay in the ”pull” of the cities, with the appeal of urban employ-
ment that offered workers security, a series of benefits, and prestige. Yet, there
were also ”push” features. These included escape from poorer regions, unhappi-
ness with co-operatives, and the loss of income-earning opportunities, whichwere
associated with the market as the state truncated private commerce and national-
ized enterprises (Cheng and Selden 9). According to historical data, China’s ur-
ban population increased from10.6%of total population in 1949 to 14.6% in 1956,
with a net gain of 34.6 million. Rural migrants accounted for 19.8 million of the
total increase.
Due to the unexpected dramatic inflow of rural migrants to urban regions, the
authorities issued a number of documents to control the huge domestic move-
ment. When measures prompted by these state guidelines failed to stanch the
population flow to major cities, the hukou system was promulgated as a perma-
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nent system in 1958 (Chan and Zhang 7).
Ironically, as the regulations were put into effect, the whole country was swept
by the radical campaign of theGreat Leap Forward. As the top priority of the state
shifted to accelerating industrial growth, this new legislation was simply brushed
aside as urban enterprises increased recruitment of labor, prompting some super-
high rates of rural-urban migration in 1958-1959.
Then, in 1964, the State Council approved the Regulation of the Ministry of
Public Security on Hukou Change. It put tight control on migration to towns
or cities from the countryside or to cities from towns. Consequently, from 1965,
movement from rural to urban areas became virtually impossible because hukou
was (and is) ascribed at birth based upon one’s mother’s hukou status, and could
not be altered.
Through the strict food rationing system and state-control of all industries, the
unreachable gap between rural and urban household registration populations was
formed after 1964. The rural agricultural hukou people could no longer freely mi-
grate into cities to seek better living conditions. Only several groups were per-
mitted to receive a change from rural to urban hukou under the stringent system
(known as nongzhuanfei)—recruitment by a state-owned enterprise (zhaogong),
enrollment in an institution of higher education (zhaosheng), promotion to se-
nior administrative jobs (zhaogan) (Yang and Zhou 42). However, the groups
mentioned above are basically a very small percentage of the whole population.
Furthermore, if one chose to migrate without going through state channels, that
person was not permitted access to resources in the destination area. Denial of
food, housing, education, and any other social services rendered illegal migration
impossible to maintain (Grey 17).
In short, the hukou system acted as a domestic passport system to draw a chasm
in the Chinese society. It served to produce and reproduce social segregation and
social disparity, especially during the planned economy from 1965 to 1978. While
economic dualism (rural/urban) is characteristic of most developing countries
and is also existent in China, the hukou system has reproduced a much stronger
social dualism through economic, and more importantly, institutional means.
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Data
Data were derived from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), an on-
going longitudinal survey initiated in eight provinces in 1989. While the survey
was not nationally representative, the provinces did vary substantially in geogra-
phy, stage of economic development and health status. At present, there are about
4,400 households in the overall survey, covering some 19,000 individuals. Follow-
up levels were high, but families that migrated from one community to a new one
were not followed. The first round of CHNS data was collected in 1989. Eight
additional waves were collected in 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and
2011.
The key explanatory variable in the studywas the type of hukou (urban or rural)
a respondent held. Respondents were asked: “What type of household registra-
tion do you belong to?” The survey recorded an individual’s ranking with one if he
or she had urban hukou, and zero otherwise.
The sample used was of men and women obtained from longitudinal sections
between 1989 and 2011, for whom there were complete sets of data. Only indi-
viduals born after 1940 were included to minimize selection bias from the aged
group. The survey was used as cross-sectional instead of panel, since there were
little within-group variations of individual hukou status. Table 1 provides descrip-
tive statistics of the principal variables used in regressions for the overall survey
population, as well as different subgroups.
Multiple measures of overall health were used as dependent variables. There
were three questions in the CHNS, which provide general information about the
respondent’s assessment of his or her state of health. Taking these questions in or-
der, respondents are asked: ”Right now, howwould you describe your health com-
pared to that of other people your age? Excellent, good, fair, poor, or unknown?”
I recoded an individual’s ranking as one if they are in good or excellent health, and
zero otherwise. This variable is labeled Self-Reported Good Health. The mean
values presented in Table 1 indicated that approximately 71% of respondents de-
scribe themselves as being in good overall health. Only about 70% of respondents
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in the subgroup, with rural hukou, identified themselves as in good overall health
compared to 72.5% in the subgroup with urban hukou.
Next, in relation to illness or infirmity, each respondent was asked: “During the
past 4 weeks, have you been sick or injured? Have you suffered from a chronic
or acute disease?” This was coded as a single dichotomous variable labeled: No
illness. Themean values, presented in Table 1, suggested that the proportion of re-
spondents who suffered from some illness was approximately 9.4%. About 11.5%
of respondents in the rural hukou subgroup suffered from some illness while only
about 8%of urbanhukou respondents reported some illness in the past fourweeks.
A subsequent question asked: “Over the past three months, have you had any
difficulty in carrying out your daily activities and work due to illness?” (Daily ac-
tivities are thought to include activities such aswalking upstairs without assistance
or feeding oneself.) This question offered more precise detail on the implications
of the illness, as it measured the individual’s level of independence. This variable
was labeled: No activity-limiting illness. From Table 1, it was apparent that ap-
proximately 6.22% of individuals in the data suffered from an activity-limiting ill-
ness. About 6% of individuals in the subgroup with rural hukou suffered from an
activity-limiting illness, while around 6.9% of urban hukou respondents reported
some activity-limiting illness in the past three months. All three health variables
can be interpreted as measurements of the individual’s perceptions of his or her
overall stock of health capital.
In Table 3.0.1, only 30% of the respondents had health insurance, with approx-
imately 49.3% in the urban hukou subgroup, and only about 19.5% in the rural
hukou subgroup. Also, over 60% of the whole sample held rural hukou and only
32.3% of households were located in urban areas. There was a huge income gap
related to hukou status, no matter how the income was calculated. The average





From the background information on the hukou system, it was apparent that indi-
viduals born before 1964 had the opportunity to obtain a non-agricultural hukou
type. Theywould have had tomigrate to urban areas before the imposition of tight
control on the hukou system, in 1964. This change in hukou policy allowed us to
apply a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design. Under some mild regularity
conditions, the average causal effect of hukou status onhealth for cohorts born just
before and just after the cutoff could be identified. There was no discontinuity in
income or other covariants among residents born around 1964.
Assuming one hukou-status cutoff and a homogeneous effect of hukou status
on health outcomes (Van der Klaauw 2002):
Yi = γE(Ki|Xi) + a(Xi) + ui, (3.1)
E(Ki|Xi) = β1(Xi ≥ X0) + b(Xi), (3.2)
where i indexed individuals, Yi denoted the outcome of interest (for example,
self-reported health state) for individual i,Ki was the hukou status,Xi was the birth
year, and X0 was the value of hukou-status cutoff (i.e., 1965), a(.) and b(.) were
flexible functions of birth year, andE(ui|Xi) = 0. In the present setting thismodel
corresponded to a ”fuzzy” (as opposed to ”sharp”) RD design. As Figure 3.0.1
indicated, birth year affected, but did not perfectly explain, hukou status. In the
baseline specifications, I used local quadratic regression (a local polynomial of or-
der two) for a(.) and b(.).
Table 3.0.2 reported the results of the OLS regressions. A positive coefficient
implied a positive connection between urban hukou and better health. OLS re-
gressions for ease of interpretationwere displayed. Logitmodels produced similar
results. The OLS estimates reflected a highly statistically significant correlation
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between better health outcomes and urban hukou. A change from rural to urban
hukou improved the chances of being in good health by 2.1 percentage points. The
urban hukou people had 1.1% more chance to report a risk of suffering from an
illness. There was no significant difference between urban and rural hukou in ex-
periencing an activity-limiting illness.
Table 3.0.3 reported the results of the RD analysis. Column 1 presented the
first-stage regression of urban hukou on indicators for whether an individual was
born after 1964, along with the quadratic spline for birth year. The coefficients
on the cutoff indicator was an estimate of the average decline, in probability, of
urban hukou at this break. Consistent with the visual evidence in Figure 3.0.1a,
the probabilty of having urban hukou dropped by about 6.7% at the threshold.
Figure 3.0.2 presented “raw” means of self-reported health status, along with
the fitted values of a locally weighted regression, calculated within each birth year
cohort. Around the cutoff, the change in hukou legislation was accompanied by a
decrease in the average self-reportedhealth status. This observationwas alsoborne
out by the regression results. Columns 2–4 of Table 3.0.3 presented reduced-form
regressions of self-reported health status, infirmity, and activity-limiting illness,
showing positive and significant increases in health outcomes at the cutoff.
After exploring thepossible causal relationshipbetweenhukou status andhealth
outcomes, I examined channels through which hukou status influenced later life
health outcomes. As mentioned earlier, I hypothesized that the effects of hukou
work through mechanisms such as occupational segregation, wage differentials,
and social isolation. Just as it seemed implausible to argue that hukou reforms
could directly manipulate health outcomes, it seemed reasonable to assume that
a change in hukou legislation only affected financial earnings, years of schooling,
or access to healthcare through hukou status, shaping these dependent variables
indirectly. Specifically, I applied the same RD model to investigate the impact of
hukou status on the availability of healthcare.
The regressions were presented in Table 3.0.4. The dependent variable repre-
sented the availability of healthcare. The OLS estimates reflected a highly statisti-
cally significant correlation between healthcare accessibility and urban hukou. A
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change fromrural tourbanhukou improved the chancesof havinghealth insurance
by 51.6%.
After controlling for income, availability of health insurance, and educational
fulfillment, the effects of hukou on health outcomes were no longer significant.
These results provided support that hukou status acted on health mainly through
discrimination against rural migrants in financial income, access to health cover-
age, and educational accomplishment.
Discussions
Fromthe results, it is clear that urbanhukoudwellers have amuchbetter chance for
self-evaluated good health compared to rural hukou dwellers. The possible expla-
nations for this result are that urban hukou status grants people with better access
to health allowance, public hospitalization, and higher economic income. Those
with urban hukou are less likely to have to work in places with bad working condi-
tions or poor sanitary circumstances.
The urbanites with urban hukou, however, reported more occurrence of diffi-
culty in carrying out daily activities and work due to illness. There are two possi-
ble explanations. First, as they havemuch broader access to public health facilities,
urban hukou inhabitants may be more concerned about infirmity, taking a break
from daily activities and work when they are ill. Whereas, rural hukou people usu-
ally still carry out their daily-life activities and work, even when they are sick, in
order to keep their income steady.
Second, as urban hukou households are, on average, smaller than that of ru-
ral hukou households, and most urban hukou citizens hold full-time employment
outside of the household, urban hukou individuals probably encounter more dif-
ficulties in getting care by other family members when they are sick. They will,
therefore, easily recognize themselves as not carrying out daily activities andwork.
In contrast, most rural hukou people do not have permanent full-time jobs, but
have larger families with extended familymembers around the household. The in-
dividuals will be looked after when they are sick and will not identify themselves
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as activity-limited by poor health.
The interpretation of the results of this article involves an exploration of the
mechanisms that lay behind the observed causal relationship. The hukou effects
estimated here may pick up indirect effects of hukou on health as well as direct ef-
fects. I emphasize the role of healthcare accessibility in this case. A change from
rural to urbanhukou significantly improves the chances of havinghealth insurance.
TheMinistry of Labor and Social Security provides health insurance plans only
to urban hukou residents. Rural people have limited access to sanitation and other
healthcare facilities. This limited access to healthcare is likely to have detrimental
impact on their health.
Conclusions
Prior studies suggested that institutional discrimination has deleterious effects on
health outcomes (Chan and Zhang 7; Grey 17; Li et al. 25). Since research has
mostly been done in thewestern context where social segregation has already been
established, it is difficult to isolate the effect of initial social segregation on health
outcomes.
In this paper, I provideplausible evidenceon a causal relationshipbetween insti-
tutional discrimination andhealthoutcomesby exploiting a 1964 change inhouse-
hold registration system(hukou) inChina, which caused anationwide discrimina-
tion against rural dwellers. RD estimates show that changing from a rural to urban
household registration type increases the probability of being in good health by
more than 10%. In particular, rural hukou people have a significantly worse self-
evaluation of health than urban hukou people.
Since the causal effects of hukou disappeared after controlling for income dis-
parity, healthcare variations, andyearsof schooling, hukou statuspotentiallyworks
on health through mechanisms such as access to quality education, availability of
health facilities, and wage differentials. I focused on the role of healthcare accessi-
bility. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security provides health insurance plans
only to urban hukou residents. Rural people have limited access to sanitation and
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other healthcare facilities. This limited access to healthcare is likely to have detri-
mental impact on their health.
The findings suggest that rural hukou people, as a group, face more access bar-
riers than urbanites. In particular, health insurance is very important in reduc-
ing access barriers. Our results could aid policy makers in assessing critical needs
among rural population and set policy priorities accordingly. Obviously, provid-
ing healthcare coverage for every citizen is costly, and China may not be at the
stage of economic development where such policy is a possibility or a priority.
Some nationwide or localized policies could potentially alleviate access barriers
faced by rural citizens and help to improve their health outcomes. For instance,
community-based free or subsidized clinics can be very beneficial. Also, subsi-
dized services for gynecological and maternal-child healthcare can provide good
safety measures for female rural dwellers and their children.
My work thus far suggests that rural hukou status has a deleterious effect on
health outcomes. Due to data limitation, I cannot explore, in greater depth, chan-
nels throughwhich hukou status influenced later life health outcomes in this study.
Also, the CHNS data does not allow me to check the variation in health among
childrenborn in theurbanhousehold, versus children thatmoved tourban settings
with their parents. The next steps would be to build a stronger overall evidence
base. A natural follow-up work is to carry out a well-developed and detailed sur-
vey, which will better confirm the causal relationship between health and hukou
status. It will also help investigate the channels throughwhich hukou status affects
later-life health outputs.
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Table 3.0.1: Summary Statistics of Important Variables for Different Sub-samples
Variable Total Survey All individuals with All individuals with
Population Rural hukou Urban hukou
Mean[std] Mean[std] Mean[std]
Self-reportedGood 0.712[0.453] 0.699[0.459] 0.725[0.464]
Health
No Illness 0.906[0.291] 0.885[0.271] 0.920[0.319]
NoActivity-limiting 0.938 [0.242] 0.939[0.239] 0.932[0.251]
Illness
Health insurance 0.301[0.657] 0.195[0.627] 0.493[0.791]
Hukou (1=rural, 0.618[0.486]
0=urban)
Urban household 0.323[0.494] 0.170[0.375] 0.549[0.498]
(1=yes, 0=no)
Female 0.500[0.500] 0.504[0.500] 0.500[0.500]
Age 35.107[20.406] 37.240[19.604] 42.429[19.721]
Age Squared 1648.944[1591.684] 1760.671[1556.800] 2163.760[1723.600]
Years of Schooling 4.700[3.390] 4.600[3.306] 4.745[3.530]
Total Net Household 6027.719[9203.700] 4709.970[7185.800] 9952.430[12986.000]
Income
Total Net Individual 4085.650[7130.500] 3838.910[5665.880] 7939.400[10682.030]
Income
N 47171 29152 18019
Standard errors in brackets.
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Table 3.0.2: OLS Specifications: hukou effects
Self-reported good health No illness No activity-limiting illness
(1) (2) (3)
hukou 0.021*** 0.011*** -0.006
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
age 0.000 0.006** -0.004
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
age2 -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
birthyear -0.006*** 0.012*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 42654 71115 30131
R2 0.057 0.034 0.008
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
- 0.1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Figure 3.0.2: Self-reported health status and birth year from 1940 to 1990
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Table 3.0.3: First-Stage and Reduced-Form Specifications: hukou effects
First Stage Reduced form
Urban Self-reported No activity
hukou good health No illness -limiting illness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Born After 1964 -0.067*** -0.127*** 0.066* -0.063
(0.014) (0.037) (0.032) (0.083)
birthyear 0.05*** 0.000 0.057** 0.000
(0.004) (.) (0.019) (.)
birthyear*year65 -0.004 0.014 -0.049* -0.061*
(0.005) (0.011) (0.022) (0.028)
birthyear2*year65 -0.001- -0.003*** 0.004 -0.004-
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
birthyear2 0.000*** 0.001 0.000 0.004***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
age .0421 -0.012 0.099*** -0.034-
(0.0421) (0.010) (0.011) (0.020)
agesqu 0.00 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000
0.00 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 54401 40408 39167 25100
R2 0.009 0.0452 0.0442 0.0175
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
- 0.1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 3.0.4: Healthcare accessibility: hukou effects
OLS Reduced form
(1) (2)
hukou (1=urban; 0=rural) 0.516***
(0.013)














Robust standard errors in parentheses.
- 0.1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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